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Recovery of Consequential Damages for Product 
Recall Expenditures 
Bradford Stone* 
Under the National Tr&c and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 
1966,' automobile manufacturers may be required to incur large 
recall expenditures if they manufacture an automobile that has 
safety impairing defects. Since many of the component parte of 
automobiles are supplied by independent enterprises, a safety 
defect in an automobile may be traceable to defective parts sup- 
plied by an independent supplier. A 238-page report by the au- 
thor summarized a study that he conducted jointly with Profes- 
sor Arthur F. Southwick' concerning the potential liability of a 
supplier of defective parts for an automobile manufacturer's re- 
call expenditures. This article is a condensation and update of 
that report? 
This article inquires into the law governing the potential li- 
ability of a commercial heat treater for recall expenditures in- 
curred by an automobile manufacturer as a result of its use of 
defective materials supplied to it by the heat treater. The con- 
clusion reached here is that in determining liability courts will 
consider factors beyond the traditional Hadley v. Baxendale 
foreseeability test governing consequential damages. Although 
these factors may not be articulated in courts' opinions, they re- 
flect important policy considerations that influence the results in 
reported product recall decisions. Although the following analy- 
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sis focuses on a typical fact situation arising in the automobile 
industry, the principles discussed are applicable to the law of 
consequential damages in general. 
Suppose Heat Treater either buys 50,000 bolts or manufac- 
tures them itself. It heat treats the 50,000 bolts, then sells and 
delivers them to Auto Company with the knowledge that they 
will be &xed to the steering mechanisms of new automobiles.' 
The bolts are sold pursuant to Auto Company's purchase order 
form that states in part: 
Warranty: Seller expressly warrants that all the material and 
work covered by this order will conform to the specifications, 
drawings, samples or other descriptions furnished or specified 
by Buyer, and will be merchantable, of good material and 
workmanship and free from defect. Seller expressly warrants 
that all the material covered by this order, which is the prod- 
uct of Seller or is in accordance with Seller's specifications, will 
be fit and sac ien t  for the purposes intended. 
Of the 50,000 bolt lot, 500 are defective. The defects are not 
immediately discovered, and the 50,000 bolts are affixed to the 
steering mechanisms of 50,000 automobiles. 
Subsequently, several steering mechanism failures result 
from the defective bolts. Auto Company investigates its records 
and determines that the reported defective bolts all come from 
the lot of 50,000 sold to it by Heat Treater. Auto Company is 
then forced to launch a recall campaign pursuant to the provi- 
sions of the Federal Safety Act6 and (1) replaces 10,000 bolts 
4. Since Heat Treater in this hypothetical example sells heat-treated bolts, the gov- 
erning law is the Uniform Commercial Code. If on the other hand Heat Treater were in 
the business of providing heat treating as a service, the governing law would be common 
law principles. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS $ 330 (1932). Since the U.C.C. has 
adopted the common law rule governing consequential damages, however, the rule gov- 
erning Heat Treater is the same even when it is providing a service. See U.C.C. $ 2- 
715(1), (2)(a), Comments 1 & 2. An alternative ground for bringing heat treating as a 
service within the ambit of the U.C.C. is the argument that the U.C.C. applies by anal- 
ogy to services. See U.C.C. $ 1-102, Comment 1. 
5. The Federal Safety Act provides in relevant part: 
If any motor vehicle . . . contains a defect which relates to motor vehicle 
safety, after the sale of such vehicle or item of equipment by a manufacturer or 
a distributor to a distributor or a dealer and prior to the sale of such vehicle or 
item of equipment by such distributor or dealer: 
(1) The manufacturer or distributor, as the case may be, shall immediately 
repurchase such vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment from such distrib- 
4851 CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES 487 
afiixed to the steering mechanism of 10,000 autos still in the 
possession of dealers, and (2) seeks to replace 40,000 bolts af- 
fixed to the steering mechanism of 40,000 autos purchased by 
40,000 ultimate cons~rners.~ 
utor or dealer at the price paid by such distributor or dealer, plus all transpor- 
tation charges involved and a reasonable reimbursement of not less than 1 per 
centum per month of such price paid prorated from the date of notice of such 
nonconformance to the date of repurchase by the manufacturer or distributor; 
or 
(2) In the case of motor vehicles, the manufacturer or distributor, as the 
case may be, at his own expense, shall immediately furnish the purchasing dis- 
tributor or dealer the required conforming part or parts or equipment for in- 
stallation by the distributor or dealer on or in such vehicle and for the installa- 
tion involved the manufacturer shall reimburse such distributor or dealer for 
the reasonable value of such installation plus a reasonable reimbursement of 
not less than 1 per centum per month of the manufacturer's or distributor's 
selling price prorated from the date of notice of such nonconformance to the 
date such vehicle is brought into conformance with applicable Federal Stan- 
dards . . . . 
15 U.S.C. 8 1400 (1976). 
If a manufacturer- 
(1) obtains knowledge that any motor vehicle or item of replacement equip- 
ment manufactured by him contains a defect and determines in good faith that 
such defect relates to motor vehicle safety; 
. . . . 
. . . he shall furnish notification to the Secretary and to owners, pur- 
chasers, and dealers, in accordance with section 1413 of this title, and he shall 
remedy the defect or failure to comply in accordance with section 1414 of this 
title. 
Id. 8 1411. 
(a) Contents of notification 
The notification required by section 1411 or 1412 of this title respecting a 
defect in or failure to comply of a motor vehicle or item of replacement equip- 
ment shall contain, in addition to such other matters as the Secretary may 
prescribe by regulation - 
(1) a clear description of such defect or failure to comply; 
. . a .  
(c) Method of notification 
The notification required by section 1411 or 1412 of this title with respect 
to a motor vehicle or item of replacement equipment shall be accomplished 
(1) in case of a motor vehicle, by first class mail to each person who is 
registered under State law as the owner of such vehicle and whose name and 
address is reasonably ascertainable by the manufacturer through State records 
or other sources available to him, 
.... 
(4) by certified mail or other more expeditious means to the dealer or deal- 
ers of such manufacturer to whom such motor vehicle or replacement equip- 
ment was delivered; and 
(5) by certified mail to the Secretary, if section 1411 of this title applies. 
Id. 8 1413. 
6. The cost of conducting the recall campaign will probably be substantial. The 
following estimates are not unrealistic: 
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Assuming that Heat Treater is liable for breach of an ex- 
press warranty, Auto Company can recover actual damages.' 
However, the amount of actual damages recovered would prob- 
ably be relatively insignificant? The more important question is 
whether Auto Company can recover the costs of the recall cam- 
paign as consequential damages. 
A. Auto Company's Argument for Recovery 
Section 2-714(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) 
states, "In a proper case any incidential and consequential dam- 
ages under the next section may also be recovered." U.C.C. sec- 
tion 2-715(2) then states, 
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach 
include 
(a) any loss resulting from general or particular require- 
ments and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting 
had reason to know and which could not reasonably be pre- 
vented by cover or otherwise; and 
(b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from 
any breach of warranty. 
Taken at face value, this statute seems to imply that Heat 
Treater is liable for the costs of the recall campaign that Auto 
Company is required to conduct under the Federal Safety Act. 
Heat Treater at the time of contracting had reason to know (in 
$350,000-Cost of reimbursing dealer for the expense of installing new bolts 
plus reimbursement of not less than one percent per month of Auto 
Company's selling price prorated from date of notice of the defect to the 
date the vehicles are brought into conformity with federal standards as 
required by 15 U.S.C. 8 1400 (1976). 
$80,000-Coat of mailing notices to 40,000 purchasers pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 
§# 1411, 1413 (1976). 
$390,000-Cost of replacing the bolt in 39,000 vehicles returned to dealers (as- 
suming 1000 did not respond to written notices). 15 U.S.C. § 1414 
(1976). 
$820,000--Total 
7. Actual damages for the heat-treated bolts are small. In this example, the cost of 
heat treating 50,000 bolts would be approximately $125. The cost of the bolts plus the 
cost of the heat treating would be approximately $2,000. These combined costs are small 
when compared with approximate total recall mt of $820,000. 
8. U.C.C. § 2-714(2) states, "The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the 
difference at  the time and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted 
and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circum- 
stances show proximate damages of a different amount." 
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fact did know) Auto Company's general or particular require- 
ments and needs, i.e., that the bolts were to be used in steering 
mechanisms. Since any defect relating to motor vehicle safety 
imposes upon Auto Company the obligation to conduct a recall 
campaign pursuant to the Federal Safety Act: Heat Treater 
would be liable for the losses resulting from its breach of war- 
ranty, including the costs of the recall campaign. Comment 2 to 
U.C.C. section 2-715 clarifies the meaning of "reason to know" 
by referring to that phrase's historical origins: 
Subsection (2) operates to allow the buyer, in an appropriate 
case, any consequential damages which are the result of the 
seller's breach. The "tacit agreement" test for the recovery of 
consequential damages is rejected. . . . The older rule at  com- 
mon law which made the seller liable for all consequential 
damages of which he had "reason to know" in advance is fol- 
lowed . . . . Subparagraph (2) carries forward the provisions 
of the prior uniform statutory provision [Uniform Sales Act] as 
to consequential damages resulting from . breach of warranty 
It is apparent from this comment that an understanding of 
the history of consequential damages is essential in order to 
grasp the significance and meaning of U.C.C. section 2-715 relat- 
ing to consequential damages. 
B. Historical Development of the Law 
1. Older common law rule 
The leading case in the area of consequential damages is 
Hadley v. Baxendale.l0 In Hadley the shaft of plaintiff's steam- 
mill had broken and was delivered to defendant, a carrier, who 
agreed to deliver it to an engineer so that it could be used as a 
model for a new shaft. The carrier did not 'deliver the shaft 
promptly, which resulted in plaintiff's mill remaining idle for a 
longer period of time than it would have otherwise. Plaints 
brought a contract action claiming damages for profits lost while 
the mill was idle. The court held that plaintiff could not recover 
damages for the loss of profits: 
Now we think the proper rule in such a case as the present 
is this:-Where two parties have made a contract which one of 
9. 15 U.S.C. 33 1400, 1411, 1413 (1976). 
10. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 185L). 
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them has broken, the damages which the other party ought to 
receive in respect of such breach of contract should be such as 
may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising natu- 
rally, i.e., according to the usual course of things, from such 
breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be sup- 
posed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the 
time they made the contract, as the probable result of the 
breach of it. Now, if the special circumstances under which the 
contract was actually made were communicated by the plain- 
tiffs to the defendants, and thus known to both parties, the 
damages resulting from the breach of such a contract, which 
they would reasonably contemplate, would be the amount of 
injury which would ordinarily follow from a breach of contract 
under these special circumstances so known and communi- 
cated. But, on the other hand, if these special circumstances 
were wholly unknown to the party breaking the contract, he, at 
the most, could only be supposed to have had in his contem- 
plation the amount of injury which would arise generally, and 
in the great multitude of cases not affected by any special cir- 
cumstances, from such a breach of contract. For, had the spe- 
cial circumstances been known, the parties might have spe- 
cially provided for the breach of contract by special terms as to 
the damages in that case; and of this advantage it would be 
very unjust to deprive them. Now the above principles are 
those by which we think the jury ought to be guided in esti- 
mating the damages arising out of any breach of contract." 
The court therefore held that damages are not recoverable 
unless they were within the contemplation of the parties at the 
time of contracting. Conversely, damages contemplated by the 
parties are recoverable. 
Professor McCormick summarizes the Hadley v. Baxendale 
rule as follows: 
The leading case of Hadley v. Baxendale lays down the rule 
that damages for breach of contract can be recovered only for 
such losses as were reasonably foreseeable, when the contract 
was made, by the party to be charged. In other words, such 
losses must be either of the type usually resulting from breach 
of like contracts, or, if unusual, the circumstances creating the 
special hazard must have been communicated to the defaulter 
before he made the bargain.la 
11. Id. at 151. 
12. C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES 562 (1935). Professor McCormick makes the following 
observations concerning the Hadky u. Baxendale rule: 
4851 CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES 491 
Professor McCormick notes, however, that the Hadley v. 
Baxendale rule has retained considerable elasticity. In discuss- 
ing what constitutes notice of special circumstances sufficient to 
impose liability for consequential damages upon a contract 
breacher, he notes that 
the decisions differ greatly, and it seems that the court's hold- 
ing as to the sufficiency of the notice is likely to depend on the 
fairness of the particular claim for consequential loss, and es- 
pecially upon whether the defendant's breach was deliberate, 
or excusable, and upon the proportion between the risk sought 
to be imposed upon defendant and expected gain under the 
contract.ls 
2. Tacit agreement test 
An alternative test to determine the allowability of conse- 
quential damages was enunciated in decisions after Hadley v. 
Baxendale. The "tacit agreement test" required not only that 
the consequential damages be foreseeable at  the time of con- 
tracting, but also required a showing that the defendant had ex- 
pressly or impliedly agreed to assume liability for the conse- 
quential damages.14 
The leading American case adopting the tacit agreement 
The significance of the case lies not in the dictum that if notice is given 
liability will attach, for, as we have seen, unlimited liability had previously 
been the general standard. The history making influence of the case lies in the 
decision that liability will not attach for damage which was not "in the con- 
templation" of the parties "at the time they made the contract." I t  lays down 
a general standard of foreseeability of damage as at the time of the bargain, by 
which judges can prevent or overturn the allowance by juries of claims which 
would saddle on the defendant losses thought by the judges to be unjust or 
disproportionate. 
. . . .  
While it has occasionally been criticized, the acceptance in this country of 
the principle of Hadley v. Baxendale has been well-nigh universal by the 
courts, and it has found a place in some of the Codes. Its effect, by subjecting 
all contract claims to a test of foreseeability by the contract breaker of the loss 
at the time of the making of the contract, diminishes the risk of business en- 
terprise, and the result harmonized we11 with the free trade economic philoso- 
phy of the Victorian era during which our law of contracts became 
systematized. 
Id. at 564-65, 566-67 (emphasis added). 
13. Id. at 571 (emphasis added). For a discussion of cases illustrating the elasticity 
of the notice concept, see id. at 572-73. 
14. See generally Bauer, Consequential Damages in Contract, 80 U .  PA. L. REV. 687 
(1932). 
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test was Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co? In Globe a 
Kentucky buyer of cotton-seed oil brought an action against a 
Texas seller for failure to deliver the oil as agreed. Under the 
agreement the seller was to deliver the oil to the buyer's railroad 
cars in Texas. The buyer alleged that the seller knew that buyer 
had to send its railroad cars from Kentucky to Texas to pick up 
the oil and therefore sought consequential damages for the ex- 
pense of the wasted trip. The trial judge held, based on informa- 
tion found on the face of the complaint, that consequential dam- 
ages were not recoverable. This holding was aflirmed by the 
United States Supreme Court. Writing for the Court, Justice 
Holmes stated that plaintiffs recovery 
depends on what liability the defendant fairly may be sup- 
posed to have assumed consciously, or to have warranted the 
plaintiff reasonably to suppose that it assumed, when the con- 
tract was made. 
It may be said with safety that mere notice to a seller of 
some interest or probable action of the buyer is not enough 
necessarily and as a matter of law to charge the seller with spe- 
cial damage on that account if he fails to deliver the goods.16 
The tacit agreement test has never received wide acceptance 
by the courts.17 The rule merely 
adds the fiction of a tacit promise to the original fiction of 
"contemplation" and seldom is there anything in the situation 
more definite and mandatory than the judge's sense of justice 
to tell him to find the presence or absence of this silent prom- 
ise to assume the risk. The recurrent cropping up of the idea in 
the opinions of the courts indicates that some of the judges 
have found the conception useful in giving expression to this 
sense of the justice of the situation. If so, this serves as its 
justification.18 
15. 190 U.S. 540 (1903). 
16. Id. at 544-45. 
17. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, a t  580. See also 1 T.  SEDGWICK, DAMAGES 
5 160 (9th ed. 1913). RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS # 330 (1932) adopted the doctrine of 
Hadky v. &redale with no mention of the qualification in Globe Refining Co. 
18. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, at  580. 
However useful the idea may be for inclusion in appellate opinions, its value as 
a formula for use in the instructions at  the trial is questionable. It has been 
held, however, that the issue whether defendant has impliedly agreed to be 
responsible for consequential losses should, if the evidence raises doubt, be left 
to the jury. Lonergan v. Waldo, 179 Mass. 135, 60 N.E. 479, 88 Am. St. Rep. 
365 (1901), Crane's Cases on Damages, 98. But it may well be assumed in most 
casea that, if the issue of "contemplation" is explained and submitted the fur- 
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Perhaps the most articulate defense of the tacit agreement 
test was formulated by Professor Bauer who argued: 
On the facts in Hadley u. Baxendale, the "contemplation 
of the parties" formula was used as a restriction upon the 
amount of the damages. The formula was not one that could 
properly be used to increase damages, but the seemingly un- 
wise application of the dictum that damages may be recovered 
for contemplated loss has led to numerous recoveries of dam- 
ages for losses of such a nature that it seems at least highly 
questionable whether the defendant could possibly have re- 
garded himself as assuming any liability for them when he 
made the contact. 
. . . .  
With the real decision in Hadley v. Baxendale, based upon 
the rule that damage neither actually contemplated or natural 
and probable cannot be recovered, probably no one has any 
quarrel. Damages in this class are clearly not within the terms 
of the contract. There seems to be no ground on which to say 
that the defendant has assumed liability. 
The dictum that probable damages, or the damages con- 
templated by the parties, can be recovered, has not com- 
manded the same respect of courts as has the principal rule of 
the case, and it would seem that it is right that it should be so. 
Such a dictum seems extreme. Even results actually contem- 
plated and discussed by the parties when making the contract 
may actually be elements for which the defendant has not 
assumed liability? 
3. The modern rule 
Despite the arguments advanced by Professor Bauer and 
others, the tacit agreement test never received widespread ac- 
ceptance by the courts. The Restatement of Contracts, for exam- 
ple, adopted the Hadley v. Baxendale rule.and makes no refer- 
ence b a n d  consequently rejects-the tacit agreement test? 
ther embroidery of "implied agreement" will be apt to mean nothing to the 
jury or too much. 
Id. at 580 n.59. 
19. See Bauer, supra note 14, at 690, 702. 
20. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS 5 330 (1932): 
In awarding damages, compensation is given for only those injuriea that the 
defendant had reason to foresee as a probable result of his breach when the 
contract was made. If the injury is one that follows the breach in the usual 
course of events, there is sufficient reason for the defendant to foresee it; 
otherwise, it must be shown specifically that the defendant had reason to know 
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This position is understandable, especially since the Reporter 
for the Restatement was Professor Williston,al who in his own 
writings showed no particular approval of the tacit agreement 
test. Furthermore, the U.C.C. follows a similar approach by 
adopting the rule formerly applied under the Uniform Sales Act 
that expressly rejects the tacit agreement test." 
C. Application of Relevant Law to Heat Treater's Situation 
Section 2-715(2)(a) of the U.C.C. adopts the older common- 
law rule as stated in the Restatement of Contracts section 330. 
Therefore, whether Heat Treater sold heat-treated bolts to Auto 
Company or heat-treated bolts sent to it for that purpose by 
either Auto Company or a bolt manufacturer (in which case the 
common-law rule as to services is applicable), the analysis and 
result determined by a court should be substantially similar. 
Heat Treater's liability for consequential damages in either case 
will depend upon whether those damages were "foreseeable." 
It has been assumed that Heat Treater knew that the bolts 
in question were to be affued to the steering mechanisms of 
automobiles, and therefore knew that any defects in the bolts 
would impair automobile safety.s8 Because a safety related de- 
fect imposes upon Auto Company the duty to conduct a recall 
campaign? the expenses of a recall campaign would certainly be 
a foreseeable result of Heat Treater's breach. 
However, before we assume that all is lost for Heat Treater 
if it had reason to know or foresee the recall campaign, and 
without the further limitation that it tacitly or impliedly agreed 
to assume such liability, let us survey certain current case law. 
the facts and to foresee the injury. 
Comment: 
One who has committed a breach of contract is bound to pay damages 
only for such injury as he had reason to foresee when he made the contract. 
This does not mean, however, that the defendant must have had the resulting 
injury actually in contemplation or that he promised either impliedly or ex- 
pressly to pay therefor in case of breach. 
21. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, Introduction at ix (1932). 
22. See U.C.C. 5 2-715 and Comment 2. See also Sale of Goods Act, 1892, 56 & 57 
VICT., c. 71, 5 53(2). 
23. This assumption accords with the reality of the typical factual setting. Each of 
the "big three" auto manufacturers has its particular designation for critical parts. The 
fact that suppliers will be furnishing critical parts likely to relate to motor vehicle safety 
is amply brought to these suppliers' attention by entries on purchase orders and other 
documents. 
24. See note 5 supra. 
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In Keystone Diesel Engine Co. u. Irwin,16 plaintiff, a dealer in 
diesel engines, sought to recover $623.08 as compensation for re- 
pair work it had performed on a diesel engine it had previously 
sold to defendant. The price of the engine was approximately 
$3,000. Defendant counterclaimed, alleging that he had suffered 
lost profits totaling $5,150 as a result of various engine break- 
downs and seeking damages in that amount. The trial court 
struck the counterclaim because the claim for lost profits was 
too speculative. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had little 
difficulty concluding that the damages for lost profits could be 
easily measured and stated that "[tlhe real issue to be deter- 
mined is whether the damages sought for loss of profit were 
within the contemplation of the parties to the contract here in 
dispute."28 
In concluding that liability for lost profits was not within 
the contemplation of the parties, the court apparently adopted 
the tacit agreement test, stating: 
" '[Olne of two contracting parties ought not to be allowed 
to obtain an advantage which he has not paid for . . . . If [a 
liability for the full profits that might be made by machinery 
which the defendant was transporting . . . ] had been 
presented to the mind of the ship owner at the time of making 
the contract, as the basis upon which he was contracting, he 
would at once have rejected it. . . . The knowledge must be 
brought home to the party sought to be charged, under such 
circumstances that he must know that the person he contracts 
with reasonably believes that he accepts the contract with the 
special condition attached to it.' " 
In the case at bar, no facts are alleged that would put the 
plaintiff on guard to the fact that the defendant would hold 
the plaintiff responsible for any loss of profit arising from the 
inability to use the engine in questi~n.~' 
Thus, what "contemplation of the parties" means to this 
court is not merely reasonably foreseeing the injury, but actually 
contemplating that the buyer will hold the seller liable for such 
injury. Such a concept, along with the court's quoting Globe 
25. 411 Pa. 222, 191 A.2d 376 (1963). 
26. Id. at 224, 191 A.2d at 378. 
27. Id. at 225-26, 191 A.2d at 378-79 (quoting Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton 
Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540, 545 (1903) (Holmes, J., quoting British Columbia Sawmill Co. v. 
Nettleship, L.R. 3 C.P. 499, 508 (1868))). 
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wit% approval, shows that the court is applying the tacit agree- 
ment test. Even so, that test was flatly rejected in the comments 
to U.C.C. section 2-71528 as well as in comment a of Restatement 
of Contracts section 330? 
Keystone did not go un~hallenged.~~ In 1970, Adam v. J.I. 
Case Co." was decided by the Appellate Court of Illinois. In Ad- 
a m  seller had sold a crawler-loader tractor to buyer for an in- 
stallment price of $14,896.75. Buyer was engaged in a bulldozing 
business as a general contactor for hire at $12.00 per hour. The 
business required him to perform various types of work, all of 
which the seller was aware. The tractor was defective, and al- 
though buyer called the defects to seller's attention on April 19, 
1966, seller did not correct them until July 17,1967. As a conse- 
quence, buyer lost 810 work hours or approximately $9,995.00 
while the tractor was standing in seller's shop. The tenor of the 
court's evaluation of the buyer's claim is gleaned from the fol- 
lowing statement: 
[Sellers] were under a duty to make timely repairs called for by 
their warranty but the [sellers] took an inordinate amount of 
time in making the repairs, that they were willfully dilatory or 
were careless and negligent in their work of compliance, with 
the result that [buyer] has suffered direct and consequential 
damage.84 
Then, and most relevant to our inquiry, the court stated: 
The [sellers] call attention to the case of Keystone Diesel 
Engine Co. v. Irwin, 411 Pa. 222, 191 A.2d 376, in which it was 
held that the "apecial circumstances" were the communication 
to the seller at the time of entering into the contract of sufE- 
cient facts to make it apparent that the subsequently claimed 
loss of profits was within the reasonable contemplation of the 
parties. The court remarked that the buyer had alleged no 
facts which would make the seller aware that the buyer in- 
tended to hold him responsible for any loss of profits resulting 
from inability to use the engine there involved. 
. . . In their Official Comment upon UCC 2-715(2) its 
framers make it clear that the "tacit agreement" test for the 
28. See note 22 supra. 
29. See note 20 supra. 
30. Keystone was overruled in R.I. Lampus Co. v. Neville Cement Prods. Corp., 378 
A.2d 288 (Pa. 1977). 
31. 125 Ill. App. 2d 388, 261 N.E.2d 1 (1970). 
32. Id. at 400,261 N.E.2d at 6. 
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recovery of consequential damages is rejected. The language of 
that section should not be so narrowly construed as to require 
a prior understanding or agreement that the seller would be 
bound for consequential damages in the event of his breach. If 
that is the holding of the Keystone . . . case it must be re- 
jected. The Official Comment further states that the older 
Common-Law rule which made the seller liable for all conse- 
quential damages of which he had "reason to know" in advance 
is followed, modified to require reasonable prevention of loss 
by cover or otherwise. The Code provision and the Official 
Comment make it clear that strictures are not to be applied to 
the plain meaning of the Code by adherence to what the par- 
ties may have agreed or contemplated at the time of sale. 
Rather, each case is to be considered on its merits touching 
upon the issue of special circumstances arising in that particu- 
lar case. In the instant case, it is alleged that the plaintiffs 
particular needs in his tractor business and his existing con- 
tracts were known to the defendants and that plaintiff was re- 
lying on their judgment; but notwithstanding this, the defen- 
dants were wilfully dilatory or careless and negligent in making 
the corrections or repairs called for in their warranty. We hold 
these allegations to be sufficient to show "special circum- 
stances" required by UCC 2-714(2) and that consequential 
damages have resulted and may be recovered pursuant to UCC 
2-715(2)(a).ss 
Other distinctions exist between Keystone and Adams be- 
sides the respective courts' different positions on the tacit agree- 
ment test. In Keystone the engine sold for approximately $3,000; 
the consequential damage sought amounted to $5,150. In Adams 
the installment price of the tractor was $14,896.75; the conse- 
quential damages sought amounted to $9,995.00. Hence, the 
damages were greater than the purchase price in Keystone. In 
addition there was no hint in Keystone that the seller had not 
acted in good faith. Furthermore,-the engine was inoperative for 
only twenty-seven days. In Adams by contrast, the sellers were 
"wilfully dilatory or were careless and negligent," with the result 
that the buyer lost 810 work hours because the tractor could not 
be used for approximately 15 months. Apparently these differ- 
ences had a bearing on the results of the two cases. 
The court in Keystone applied U.C.C. section 2-715(2)(a), 
the comments to which reject the tacit agreement test. Why 
33. Id. at 404-06, 261 N.E.2d at 8-9. 
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then did the court deny recovery for consequential damages, 
even though the defendant-seller probably had reason to foresee 
the harm? Some of the possible answers to this question have 
already been given here and in other discussions concerning the 
tacit agreement test as well as in the requirement regarding no- 
tice of special circumstances; others will be discussed shortly. 
Dean Leon Green, in referring to the foreseeability test, has 
commented: 
The formula is one for use in determining whether the interest 
involved is protected by the agreement. And it is not a contem- 
plation of consequences from a possible breach, but a contem- 
plation of interests which may be protected by the contract. 
Parties, in making contracts, rarely contemplate the losses 
which would result from its breach. But they do count the ad- 
vantages they will gain from its performance. What interests 
does the contract promote or serve? These are actually consid- 
ered in most part, and those which are shown to have been 
considered or reasonably falling within the terms in view of the 
language used and the background of the transaction, mark its 
boundaries-the limits of protection under it. . . . The point 
to be emphasized here is that contemplation or foresight of the 
parties as to the consequences which may follow a breach of 
the contract is utterly immaterial in this process except as one 
of the many factors to be taken into consideration in determin- 
ing the larger problem of whether the injured interest fell 
within the protection of the contract terms. More than this, it 
is highly misleading and pernicious to emphasis it as the sole 
or controlling factor." 
Thus, if we are going to make an educated prediction about 
what a court will actually hold in this area of consequential 
damages-regardless of what reasons it may give for so hold- 
ing-we must realize that the foreseeability test is only one of 
many factors to be taken into consideration. It is, in the words 
of Dean Green, "highly misleading and pernicious to emphasize 
it as the sole or controlling factor." 
We are not yet at the crux of the matter and must further 
probe by asking what factors the court (or jury, or both) will 
consider in arriving at its conclusion. Utterances found in case 
law and in scholarly writings are qualified by expressions like 
"reasonable," "prevention of hardship," "just," "fair ," and 
"scope of protection," by "attitudes not capable of exact quanti- 
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tative measurement," and by policy opinions that give little 
practical guidance. 
D. Unarticulated Factors in Consequential Damage Cases 
The principal factors that the author believes a court will 
consider relevant in reaching a conclusion-whether articulated 
in a written opinion or not-will be discussed at length in the 
following pages. They include: 
1, Is the seller compensated for the risk? 
2. Does a gross disparity exist between the compensation re- 
ceived by the seller and the damages sought by the buyer? 
3. Was the seller's breach willful? 
4. By interpretation and construction, how have the parties 
contracted to allocate risk? 
a. Did the seller and the buyer agree to extend liabil- 
ity to include the damages in question, or to limit it to 
preclude such liability? 
b. Are the seller and the buyer in a relatively equal 
bargaining position, or does a significant disparity exist 
between them? 
c. Is the agreement between the seller and the buyer 
so one-sided that the court will not enforce their 
agreement? 
d. Were the terms of the agreement reached by mean- 
ingful bargaining or are they eseentially "boilerplate"? 
e. Which party chose the language of the agreement? 
5. Which party can most economically bear the risk? 
I .  Is the seller compensated for the risk? 
Justice Holmes stated in Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cot- 
ton Oil Co. that "one of two contracting parties ought not to be 
allowed to obtain an advantage he has not paid for."s6 Surely in 
many other cases the courts have thought like Holmes but used 
the traditional language of "contemplation of the parties," and 
"reason to foresee" the harm. 
If we suppose a situation where a seller has calculated a 
risk, insured against it, and added the cost of such insurance to 
the price of his product or service, it would be clear that seller is 
compensated for the risk and consequently should bear such risk 
35. 190 U.S. at 545 (quoting British Columbia Sawmill Co. v. Nettleship, L.R. 3 C.P. 
499, 508 (1868)). 
I 
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as between himself and buyer. On the other hand, seller is not 
compensated for the risk in situations where the risk is un- 
known, or where it is known but not subject to any degree of 
calculation so as to be insurable; consequently, no attempt is or 
can be made to add a cost factor to the price of the product or 
service. Thus, a court may be inclined not to require seller to 
bear this risk. 
This idea of compensation for risk is manifested specifically 
in the law of bailments, where certain carriers under federal acts 
like the Interstate Commerce ActS6 are allowed to limit their lia- 
bility to a certain dollar amount for loss or damage to their pas- 
sengers' baggage, provided each passenger is afforded a chance 
to pay a larger fee for the carrier to assume an increased risk. 
Hence, if a passenger declares a higher value for his baggage 
than the limited dollar amount of the carrier's liability under 
this act, the carrier liability in dollar terms will be greater, but 
the passenger will have paid a larger fee to compensate the 
carrier for the additional risk assumption. Courts are likely to 
apply the "compensation for risk" logic by way of analogy to 
damages.87 
36. 49 U.S.C. 55 20(11), 319 (1976). 
37. The analogy may be stronger with respect to rules within the U.C.C. itself. For 
example, the sections of the Interstate' Commerce Act cited in note 36 supra are paral- 
leled by U.C.C. 55 7-204(2) and 7-309(2), where the compensation for risk concept is 
spelled out. (Comment 1 to U.C.C. 5 1-102 and comment 2 to U.C.C. 5 2-313 encourage 
reasoning by analogy to the U.C.C. even when the U.C.C. is not directly applicable.) The 
appropriate sections that may be applied by analogy include: 
U.C.C. 5 7-204. Duty of Care; Contractual Limitation of Warehouseman's 
Liability. 
(2) Damages may be limited by a term in the warehouse receipt or storage 
agreement limiting the amount of liability in case of loss or damage, and set- 
ting forth a specific liability per article or item, or value per unit of weight, 
beyond which the warehouseman shall not be liable; provided, however, that 
such liability may on written request of the bailor at  the time of signing such 
storage agreement or within a reasonable time after receipt of the warehouse 
receipt be increased on part or all of the goods thereunder, in which event 
increased rates may be charged based on such increased valuation, but that no 
such increase shall be permitted contrary to a lawful limitation of liability con- 
tained in the warehouseman's tariff, if any. No such limitation is effective with 
respect to the warehouseman's liability for conversion to his own use. 
U.C.C. 5 7-309. Duty of Care; Contractual Limitation of Carrier's Liability. 
(2) Damages may be limited by a provision that the carrier's liability shall not 
exceed a value stated in the document if the carrier's rates are dependent upon 
value and the consignor by the carrier's tariff is afforded an opportunity to 
declare a higher value or a value as lawfully provided in the tariff, or where no 
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2. Does a gross disparity exist between the compensation re- 
ceived by the seller and the damages sought by the buyer? 
Related to the previous question of whether the seller is 
compensated for the risk is whether a gross disparity exists be- 
tween the compensation received by seller and the damages 
sought by buyer. If so, courts may be persuaded to deny liability 
regardless of the rationale relied upon to support such a re- 
sult-e.g., no implied agreement to pay for such damage. 
This phenomenon has been observed by many writers, in- 
cluding Professor McCormick, who after reviewing certain cases 
states: 
In determining whether to tighten or relax in a particular 
case the curb upon the damages in contract cases, which they 
exert through the flexible concepts of "notice" and "reasonable 
contemplation," it seems probable that two factors, of which 
the rule itself take no account, exert a deep influence: First, the 
proportion between the burden which would be imposed on 
the defendant and the amount of compensation or gain which 
accrued to him under the contract.88 
Another commentator, Professor Bauer, analyzes the follow- 
ing hypothetical case that uses facts similar to those in Hadley 
v. Baxendale: 
[In this case] C, a carrier, contracts to carry for D a crank shaft 
to be used in D's mill. The shaft is worth $10. The freight 
charge is 50 cents. If the shaft is not delivered on time, the loss 
to D may be $5,000 a day during the delay. Assume that notice 
of the likelihood of such loss by reason of the delay has been 
given to C at the time of the making of the contract. Still may 
not the non-assumption of such liability for such contemplated 
tariff is filed he is otherwise advised of such opportunity; but no such limiation 
is effective with respect to the carrier's liability for conversion to its own use. 
38. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, at  574. In his discussion of the tacit agreement 
test Professor McCormick points out: 
Instances occur where it seems to the courts that a reasonable business 
man, under the circumstances, might be entirely aware of the probability of 
heavy damage to the other party in case of a breach, but would not understand 
or anticipate that he would be answerable for such damage if he should be 
unable to fulfill his undertaking. Often this is true in cases where the risk 
arises from some entirely separate or "collateral" engagement of the other 
party with third persons and where the hazard is so disproportionately heavy 
as not to be adequately compensated by the consideration received in the pre- 
sent venture by the one upon whom the liability would fall. 
Id. at 575-76. 
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result be implied as well as expressed? May not the implication 
of nonassumption arise from usage, the habits of dealing of the 
parties, the smallness of the consideration paid, or the general 
circumstances of the case?8s 
3. Was the seller's breach willful? 
Of course this question is supposed to be irrelevant to the 
issue of damages in a contract action since the theory of dam- 
ages is to compensate plaintiff, not penalize defendant.'O This 
theory is repeated endlessly. For example, Justice Holmes in 
Globe said that even though the defendant "maliciously caused 
the plaintiff to send [its] tanks a thousand miles," the willful- 
ness of the breach did not strengthen plaintiffs' claim for special 
damages." Professor Bauer has stated in this regard, 
Aversion and.disgust and hatred excited by a defendant's wil- 
ful breach of contract, and pity aroused by the predicament in 
which another defendant is placed by his honest and uninten- 
tional breach of contract, have swayed judges, as well as juries, 
in the actual administration of the law. 
Although this tendency to make the lot of the transgressor 
more at fault a harder lot is ordinarily a silent one, to be dis- 
cerned only by a careful study of the facts, verdict, and judg- 
ment in the case, there are many instances, even in contract 
cases, where a court has expressly recognized the propriety of 
so administering justice as to make the result more severe upon 
the defendant more seriously at fault in the breach of his con- 
tract. . . . Such a tendency may not appeal to the lawyer-logi- 
cian attempting to apply supposed exact rules of law with ideal 
syllogistic regularity; but the tendency, actually existing and 
functioning in an important way, must be noticed and reck- 
oned with. It often affects seriously the measure of damages.'= 
Similarly, Professor McCormick has noted that the degree 
of the defendant's wiIlfulness is important in determining 
whether consequential damages will be allowed. 
The French Civil Code clearly draws the line here, and protects 
39. Bauer, supra note 14, at 702, 703 (emphasis added). Cf. U.C.C. 5 2-314, Com- 
ment 7 (last sentence). 
40. See U.C.C. § 1-106, RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS 5 329, Comment a (1932), 
states, "In awarding compensatory damages, the effort is made to put the injured party 
in as good a position as that in which he would have been put by full performance of the 
contract . . . ." 
41. 190 U.S. at 547. 
42. Bauer, supra note 14, at 700, 701. 
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against unforeseen risks of the breach of contract only one who 
has not acted in bad faith. Evidence that our courts share the 
tendency to widen the liability of the deliberate contract 
breaker, as distinguished from one who has by misfortune or 
mistake failed to carry out his promise, is furnished by the in- 
stances where the courts in their opinions have called attention 
to the willfulness of the defendant. In the view of the present 
writer, this tendency is a wholesome one. . . . Our rules should 
sanction, as our actual practice probably does, the award of 
consequential damages against one who deliberately and wan- 
tonly breaks faith, regardless of the foreseeability of the loss 
when the contract was made. We shall then have completed 
the process, begun piecemeal in Hadley u. Baxendale, of bor- 
rowing from the French Civil Code its theory of damages in 
contra~t.'~ 
4. By interpretation and construction of the agreement, how 
have the parties contracted to allocate risk? 
a. Did the seller and the buyer agree to extend liability to 
include the damages in question, or to limit or preclude such 
liability? Provided no public policy is contravened, parties nor- 
mally may agree whether certain consequential damages will or 
will not be allowed against a defaulting seller. An explicit state- 
ment in the contractual agreement will certainly suffice. But if 
no such explicit statement exists, an agreement may be found to 
be implied without being vulnerable to the argument that the 
tacit agreement test is being applied contrary to the comments 
in U.C.C. section 2-715, and comment a of the Restatement of 
Contracts section 330. Comment a to Restatement of Contracts 
section 330 states: 
One who has committed a breach of contract is bound to 
pay damages only for such injury as he had reason to foresee 
when he made the contract. This does not mean, however, that 
the defendant must have had the resulting injury actually in 
contemplation or that he promised either impliedly or ex- 
pressly to pay therefore in case of breach. If he does so prom- 
ise, he is bound just as he is by any other promise. Whether or 
not such a promise was made is mainly a question of interpre- 
tation; and what performance was promised-the meaning of 
the promise-is wholly a question of interpretation. If such in- 
43. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, at 581. Thus, by enlarging consequential damages 
for willful breach of contract, the law does not penalize the breacher but instead more 
fully compensates the aggrieved party for damages resulting from the breach. 
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terpretation shows that the defendant promised to carry the 
risk of certain losses, it is his duty to pay them; and if he com- 
mits a breach of this duty, the question of legal remedy in 
damages arises. This question of remedy is not one of inter- 
pretation; it is determined by the rules for estimating dam- 
ages that are applicable to promises to pay a sum of money, 
liquidated or unliquidated. When making a contract, the con- 
tractor may look ahead as far as he likes; and in many cases he 
has power to limit in advance the payment to be made in case 
of some nonperformance. But there must always come a point 
at which interpretation ceases and the application of the law 
of remedies begins. [Emphasis added] 
As one might imagine, it is an art to determine where inter- 
pretation of the contract ceases and where the application of the 
law of remedies begins. Given, for instance, the U.C.C. provi- 
sions concerning usage of trade:' course of dealing, and course 
of perf~rmance,'~ surely some latitude exists when a court or 
jury does not wish to make the seller bear the consequential loss. 
These U.C.C. provisions enable them to find that the agreement 
did not require Heat Treater to bear this loss, without the neces- 
sity of using the tacit agreement test to make that finding. 
b. Are the seller and the buyer in a relatively equal bar- 
gaining position, or does a significant disparity exist between 
them? This factor by itself may not be of overpowering signifi- 
cance, but in combination with other factors discussed below it 
does have an effect. The suspicion arises that the party with the 
greater bargaining power may have overreached. 
c. Is the agreement between the seller and t i e  buyer so 
one-sided that the court will not enforce their agreement? This 
question is pertinent in contexts involving contracts of adhe- 
s i ~ n ' ~  or, under U.C.C. provisions, the doctrine of unconsciona- 
bility." Unconscionability is not defined in the U.C.C., but com- 
ment 1 to section 2-302 relates that it involves "oppression" or 
"unfair suprise." It  does not, however, involve a disturbance of 
allocated risks because of superior bargaining power. "The basic 
test is whether, in the light of the general commercial back- 
ground and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, 
44. See U.C.C. 5 1-205. 
45. See U.C.C. $8 1-205, 2-208. 
46. See Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Con- 
tract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943). 
47. See U.C.C. 2-302. 
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the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable 
under the circumstances existing at  the time of the making of 
the contract."48 
The above may be tested with Auto Company's warranty 
clause: 
Warranty: Seller expressly warrants that all the material and 
work covered by this order will conform to the specifications, 
drawings, samples or other description furnished or specified 
by Buyer, and will be merchantable, of good material and 
workmanship and free from defect. Seller expressly warrants 
that all the material covered by this order, which is the prod- 
uct of Seller or is in accordance with Seller's specifications, will 
be fit and s a c i e n t  for the purpose intended. 
In insisting upon this express warranty that the goods be in 
accordance with Auto Company's specifications, Auto Company 
is hardly oppressive. The further question of whether the costs 
of Auto Company's recall campaign constitute consequential 
damages is a matter of construing the appropriate rule of law, 
not a matter of interpreting the language of an agreement and 
deciding whether that language is unconscionable. It does not 
seem likely, for example, that the U.C.C.'s provisions in sections 
2-714 and 2-715 regarding consequential damage would be con- 
strued as unconscionable. 
If the warranty clause explicitly recited that Auto Company 
would be able to recover as consequential damages the'costs of a 
recall campaign, a more direct issue of unconscionability would 
be presented. To date, most warranty cases dealing with uncon- 
scionability have involved an attempt by a seller to limit or pre- 
clude liability for consequential damages? The question that 
arises when a buyer insists upon being allowed to recover all 
damages he in fact has suffered, though they amount to several 
times more than the seller's compensation for his efforts, is dif- 
ferent from the one raised when a seller seeks to limit or pre- 
clude the damages a buyer may recover, though the buyer has 
sustained such injuries. Nevertheless, if the buyer insists upon a 
clause allowing him all consequential damages in spite of the 
fact that the amount might drive seller out of business, a court 
may be influenced to hold the agreement uncon~cionable.~~ 
48. U.C.C. g 2-302, Comment 1. 
49. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). 
50. Id. Y 
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d. Were the terms of the agreement reached by meaning- 
ful bargaining or are they essentially boilerplate? Professor 
Llewellyn has suggested the following about the construction of 
form, or boiler -plate, agreements: 
Instead of thinking about "assent" to boiler-plate clauses, we 
can recognize that so far as concerns the specific, there is no 
assent at all. 
. . . .  
. . . There has been an arm's-length deal, with dickered 
terms. There has been accompanying that basic deal another 
which, if not on any fiduciary basis, at least involves a plain 
expression of confidence, asked and accepted, with a corre- 
sponding limit on the powers granted; the boiler-plate is as- 
sented to en bloc, "unsight, unseen," on the implicit assump- 
tion and to the full extent that (1) it does not alter or impair 
the fair meaning of the dickered terms when read alone, and 
(2) that its terms are neither in the particular nor in the net 
manifestly unreasonable and unfair. Such is the reality, and I 
see nothing in the way of a court's operating on that basis, to 
truly effectuate the only intention which can in reason be 
worked out as common to the two parties, granted good faith? 
Problems akin to contracts of adhesion and unconscionability 
would of course come to bear in deciding whether boiler-plate 
terms are "manifestly unreasonable and unfair." 
Thus, for example, a situation might arise where Heat 
Treater had sold goods to Auto Company according to Auto 
Company's purchase order form which included considerable 
boiler-plate language. Further assume that a court then adopted 
Llewellyn's suggested technique of construing the boiler-plate 
language. In such a case, Heat Treater has engaged in a blanket 
assent to the boiler-plate language on Auto Company's form on 
the assumption that such language is neither unreasonable nor 
unfair. If Heat Treater cannot obtain insurance to protect - 
against the risk or pass any anticipated costs on to Auto Com- 
pany, and thus cannot be compensated for such a risk, is boiler- 
plate language that includes a provision allowing damages for re- 
call expenditures "manifestly unreasonable and unfair"? The 
potential liability is great enough to spell the likelihood of Heat 
51. K. LLEWEUYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 370-71 (1960) (footnotes omitted). 
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS g 211 (1981) (all RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS citations herein refer to the unpublished manuscript to be published in 
1981). 
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Treater's economic disaster. Auto Company is presumably in a 
position to bear such expenses and add them to the cost of its 
goods. Under such circumstances a court will undoubtedly be in- 
clined to rule that such language is indeed "manifestly unrea- 
sonable and unfair." 
e. Which party chose the language of the agreement? One 
might argue that because Auto Company chose the language 
pursuant to its boiler-plate form contract, it could have explic- 
itly provided that Heat Treater would be liable for the costs of 
the recall campaign. The fact that this was not set out in the 
agreement, as well as the fact that the costs of the recall would 
likely be financially catastrophic to Heat Treater, strengthen the 
argument that a court can avail itself of a canon of interpreta- 
tion that construes the language of a contract against the person 
who chose it." In addition, who chose the language is probably 
another aspect of factor (a) above concerning the interpretation 
of the seller- buyer contract. 
5. Which party can most economically bear the risk? 
This question concerns what is likely to be the most impor- 
tant single factor in determining the extent of Heat Treater's 
liability. It is often argued that "manufacturers, as a group and 
an industry, should absorb the inevitable losses which must re- 
sult in a complex civilization from the use of their products, be- 
cause they are in the better position to do so, and through their 
prices to pass such losses on to the community at  large."" 
52. 
Utterances are to be construed most strongly against the person responsible for 
them. I t  is a general principle of interpretation that an utterance is to be inter- 
preted most strongly against the party who was responsible for it. This is par- 
ticularly true, if the contract has been embodied in a writing, and if that writ- 
ing was prepared by the skilled adviser of one of the parties, or if the person 
who drew it had special competence in such matters. 
G. GRISMORE, CONTRACTS § 104 (Rev. ed. 1964). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS g 206. 
53. Prosser, Assault upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. at  1099, 1120 (1960). See also 
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944). 
Those who suffer injury from defective products are unprepared to meet its 
consequences. The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an 
overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk 
of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public 
as a cost of doing business. It ia to the public interest to discourage the mar- 
keting of products having defects that are a menace to the public. If such prod- 
ucts nevertheless find their way into the market it is to the public interest to 
place the responsibility for whatever injury they may cause upon the manufac- 
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Even though this idea of "risk spreading" seems to influence 
the courts, it is interesting to note Chief Justice Taft's dissent- 
ing opinion in Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp.," in which he 
wrote: 
There is considerable appeal to the idea of spreading the 
risk of loss to an individual from a particular activity over 
those who engage in that activity and profit from it. However, 
before determining to do so with respect to the manufacture 
and sale of a particular product, a court should at least con- 
sider questions such as: 
(1) What additional liability would be involved? 
(2) Could insurance be procured against such addi- 
tional liability? 
(3) If so, what would its cost be? 
(4) Could such cost be passed on to buyers of the 
product? 
How can a court know the answers to such questions? A 
court such as this has no means of even exploring them. How- 
ever, these are problems which a legislature can fully explore.ss 
Also, in this regard Professor Farnsworth has stated: 
[Clonsideration should be given to such factors as the respec- 
tive abilities of the parties, at least in those standard situa- 
tions, to prevent the loss, to bear the loss, and to distribute the 
risk. The law tends, more and more, toward imposing loss upon 
the party who is best able to do these things. 
. . . . 
. . . Consideration should be given to the magnitude of the 
business and the availability and cost of liability insuran~e.~  
Courts and legislatures are frequently persuaded by the 
risk-spreading argument. The developing law of credit cards, 
which provides for distribution of loss from fraud, is an appro- 
priate illustration. Congress has amended the Federal Truth in 
turer, who even if he is not negligent in the manufacture of the product is 
responsible for its reaching the market. However, intermittently such injuries 
may occur and however haphazardly they may strike, the risk of their occur- 
rence is a constant risk and a general one. Against such a risk there should be 
general and constant protection and the manufacturer is best situated to afford 
such protection. 
Id. at 462, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring). 
54. 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966). 
55. Id. at 249-50, 218 N.E.2d at 200. 
56. Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUM. L. 
REV. 653, 670-71, 673 (1957). 
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Lending Act by adding section 133," in which a credit card 
holder's liability for the unauthorized use of the credit card is 
either precluded or limited to $50 under appropriate circum- 
stances. This preclusion or limitation is apparently a recognition 
by Congress that the credit card issuer is the party who may 
most effectively bear significant and substantial risks of loss. 
How do the above principles relate to Heat Treater's poten- 
tial liability for consequential damages suffered by Auto Com- 
pany as the result of a recall campaign? They show that the risk 
of the expense of a recall campaign could probably most eco- 
nomically be borne by Auto Company. Relying upon the above 
principles, the most appealing case for Heat Treater is made 
with the following points: 
1. Its business is an economicdy small unit. 
2. It does all or most of its business with Auto Company. 
3. Its potential liability is not subject to any degree of calcu- 
lation that would enable it to obtain insurance or set aside a 
reserve fund to cover the potential loss. 
4. The potential liability is so great that imposing the actual 
liability upon it would probably spell economic disaster. 
Heat Treater is in no position to calculate the risk, add it to 
the costs of its product or service, and thereby spread it among 
its several buyers. Auto Company, on the other hand, can eco- 
nomically spread the costs of the recall among the purchasers of 
its automobiles. Moreover, self-insurance, which involves setting 
aside a reserve fund to cover such contingencies, is further dis- 
couraged by the federal tax laws that may not permit deductions 
for contributions to such a fund.m 
Auto Company of course can argue that in this day of in- 
creased pressure for consumer protection, manufacturers and 
suppliers are more likely to produce quality goods if they are 
57. 15 U.S.C. § 1643 (1976). 
58. "Only a few reserves voluntarily established as a matter of conservative account- 
ing are authorized by the Revenue Acte. . . . Many reserves set up by prudent business 
men are not allowable as deductions." Brown v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 193, 201-02 (1934). 
See A. KRAGAN & J. MCNULTY, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 729-35 (3d ed. 1979); W. AN- 
DREW~, BASIC FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 295-96 (2d ed. 1979). Accordingly, Heat Treater 
may not reduce its taxable earnings by reserves established to meet a recall contingency. 
Further, even if Heat Treater were able to accumulate reserves after taxes, these reserves 
arguably may be subject to attack as unreasonable accumulations under the federal accu- 
mulated earnings tax (the purpose of the act is to discourage nonpayment of dividends 
to avoid the income tax at the shareholder level on the receipt of dividends). I.R.C. §§ 
531-37. See H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS, 8 339 at 692 (2d ed. 1970). 
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held accountable for defective goods. This argument is refuted, 
however, by two facts. First, Heat Treater would have a legal 
liability to some extent; it would simply not extend to all the 
recall expenses. Secondly, Heat Treater must produce satisfacto- 
rily or lose Auto Company's future business. If it does most or 
all of its business with Auto Company, it would suffer disastrous 
economic consequences if it did not produce quality goods. Mere 
survival provides motive enough for high quality. 
Auto Company might further argue that insurance to pro- 
tect against a risk diminishes the incentive to be careful to avoid 
such risk. In those instances, however, where insurance compa- 
nies are required to honor claims because of recalls, future pre- 
miums are likely to be significantly increased or coverage un- 
attainable if the insurer's losses are too high. Accordingly, this 
argument is without significant merit. 
An argument in Heat Treater's favor is that economic ruin 
to Heat Treater hurts both Auto Company and the consumer. 
The premise is that Auto Company uses Heat Treater's goods or 
services because their quality is at least as high as Auto Com- 
pany could produce itself and the cost is lower. If Auto Com- 
pany recovers from Heat Treater the costs of a recall campaign, 
Heat Treater will probably be put out of business as a conse- 
quence of the large amount of money involved. Now, since no 
one can risk a venture that might entail losses of such magni- 
tude, Auto Company itself undertakes the heat treating. The 
quality may or may not be as high; the costs are probably 
greater. When the next recall campaign occurs, Auto Company 
pays the cost since it has no supplier to proceed against. Noth- 
ing has been accomplished. The ultimate consumer receives no 
greater quality but must pay a higher price." The heat treater is 
59. Concerning the effect of a strict foreseeability test on the consumer, Professor 
Nordstrom observes: 
The difficulty with framing this question [of liability] in terms of foresee- 
ability is that it misdirects the attention of the legal system. One of the bases 
for warranty liability is that it spreads the risk of non-conforming products 
among all users of that product. 
. . . . 
The answer to this question [of liability] can probably be best found if the 
idea of foreseeability is ignored and attention is focused on the concept of risk- 
shifting, already discussed, and on the ultimate costs involved in making prod- 
ucts safer. The immediate result of a finding of product liability may be the 
bankruptcy of concerns producing the product or a withdrawal of that product 
from the market, or both. That product may never be remarketed (even 
though it benefited thousands of persons) just because the financial risks to the 
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put out of business even though its services were more than 
competitive in the market place.60 
E. Construing Laws in the Common Law Tradition 
It has been shown that courts consider numerous factors 
that are totally unrelated to the concept of foreseeability in ap- 
plying the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale. This consideration of 
outside factors raises the following question: In arriving at its 
conclusion, is it proper for a court to consider factors not taken 
account of in the formal rule of law being construed? 
Some observers and courts might feel justified in holding 
that a seller is liable if he had reason to foresee the harm simply 
because it is the "rule." It should make no difference that the 
seller is not compensated for the risk, that a gross disparity 
exists between the compensation received by seller and the dam- 
ages sought by buyer, and so on, since these factors are not in- 
cluded within the "rule." Such reasoning does not fully compre- 
hend the traditional methodology of construing common-law 
rules like that of Hadley v. Baxendale. 
Common-law rules acquired their status as rules not be- 
cause they were decreed by arbitrary judicial fiat, but because 
they were supported by sound reasoning. Therefore, according to 
Professor Llewellyn, precedent should be tested against three 
types of reasoning: 
[First] [tlhe reputation of the opinion-writing judge counts 
heavily (and it is right reason to listen carefully to the wise). 
Secondly, "principle" is consulted to check up on precedent, 
and at this period and in this way of work "principle" means 
no mere verbal tool for bringing large-scale order into the rules, 
it means a broad generalization which must yield patent sense 
as well as order, if it is to be "principle." Finally, "policy," in 
terms of prospective consequences of the rule under considera- 
tion, comes in for explicit examination by reason in a further 
test of both the rule in question and its ap~lication.~~ 
seller are too great; or, if it is placed on the market again, the cost will be 
increased. . . . 
R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES 256, 258-59 (1970) (emphasis added, 
footnotes omitted). 
60. Federal antitrust lam reflect in part a national policy discouraging the concen- 
tration of economic power. Allocating the risk of very large, uninsurable recall expenses 
to small e~onomic units seems to run contrary to this policy. See Stone, infra note 138, 
at 15-16 M. 70-74. 
61. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 51, at 36. 
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Thus in determining whether certain precedent should be 
applied in a given factual context, judges rightfully consider 
whether the reasoning that gave rise to the rule supports its ap- 
plication to the case at hand. Professor Llewelyn calls this the 
"Grand Style of the Common Law."62 Although this method of 
decision-making has seldom been expressed, it has been charac- 
teristic of common-law judging for years." To support this point 
Professor Llewellyn notes upon Justice Cardozo: 
"What is new in juristic thought today," was Cardozo's final 
word almost thirty years ago, "is chiefly the candor of its 
processes. Much that was once unavowed and kept beneath the 
surface is now avowed and open. From time immemorial law- 
yers have felt the impulse to pare down the old rules when in 
conflict with the present needs. The difference is that even 
when they yielded to the impulse, it was their habit in greater 
measure than today to disguise what they were doing, to dis- 
guise the innovation even from themselves, and to announce in 
all sincerity that it was all as it had been be f~re . "~  
This method of interpreting and applying common-law rules is 
also applicable even where the frozen language of a statute is 
involved. As Professor Llewellyn observes, "If a statute is to 
make sense, it must be read in a light of some assumed purpose. 
A statute merely declaring a rule, with no purpose or objective, 
is nonsen~e."~~ A court in applying a statutory rule will want to 
know if the facts in the case before it fall within the principle or 
62. Id. 
63. 
The proposition that legal rules can be understood only with reference to the 
purposes they serve would today scarcely be regarded as an exciting truth. The 
notion that law exists as a means to an end has been commonplace for at  least 
half a century. There is, however, no justification for assuming, because this 
attitude has now achieved respectability, and even triteness, that it enjoys a 
pervasive application in practice. Certainly there are even today few legal trea- 
tises of which it may be said that that author has throughout clearly defined 
the purposes which his definitions and distinctions serve. We are still all too 
willing to embrace the conceit that it is possible to manipulate legal concepts 
without the orientation which comes from the simple inquiry: toward what end 
is this activity directed? Nietzsche's observation, that the most common stu- 
pidity consists in forgetting what one is trying to do, retains a discomforting 
relevance to legal science. 
In no field is this more true than in that of damages. 
Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1,46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936). 
64. K .  LIJWELLYN, supra note 51, at 266-67. 
65. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Ca- 
nons about How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAM). L. REV. 395, 399-401 (1950). 
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reason of the rule, i.e., the case before the court must satisfy not 
only the language of the statutory rule but also the reasons un- 
derlying the rule. 
Professor Llewellyn's analysis of deciding appeals in the 
common-law tradition is significant for two reasons. First, his 
reputation and perceptive insight lend weight to his observa- 
tions, and "it is right reason to listen carefully to the wise." Sec- 
ond, he. was the Chief Reporter of the U.C.C., and his ideas 
about the proper construction of statutory materials have been 
embodied in the U.C.C. and its comments. His influence is par- 
ticularly seen in section 1 -102:66 
Section 1-102. Purposes; Rules of Construction; Variation by 
Agreement. , 
(1) This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to pro- 
mote its underlying purposes and policies. 
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are 
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law gov- 
erning commercial transactions; 
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial 
practices through custom, usage and agreement of the 
parties; 
(c) to make uniform the law among the various 
juridictions. 
Llewellyn's influence is also seen in comment 1 to Section 1-102, 
which states in part: 
1. Subsections (1) and (2) are intended to make it clear that: 
66. See also S. MRNTSCHIKOFF, COA~MERCUL TRANSACTIONS 3-12 (1970). 
[A problem] arises when the situation has changed in fact but seems to be one 
which on its face fits the factual preconditions of the rule. Now what do you 
do? What courts tend to do in that situation is to misconstrue the language of 
the rule in order to exclude the situation. They say that it is different, that it 
isn't really within the factual preconditions, although on any fair reading it is, 
because they want to escape the consequence. What the Code [in Comment 1 
to U.C.C. 5 1-1021 did was to give specific authority to the court in that situa- 
tion not to mishandle the language of the text, but to say this is a factual 
situation which is different in terms of its reason and therefore we will not 
apply the rule; we will limit the rule so that it excludes the situation. The 
court's opinion would then move in terms of why the factual situation before 
the court ought as a matter of policy and reason to be excluded even though it 
&ma to fall within the language of the statute. 
Id. at 11. 
Professor Llewellyn, commenting on the draf t i i  philosophy of the U.C.C., has also 
stated tha? "open-ended drafting, with room for courts to move in and readjust over the 
decades had been a basic piece of the planning." K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 51, at 183 
11.186. 
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This act is drawn to provide flexibility so that, since it is 
intended to be a semi-permanent piece of legislation, it will 
provide its own machinery for expansion of commercial prac- 
tices. It is intended to make it possible for the law embodied in 
this Act to be developed by the courts in the light of unfore- 
seen and new circumstances and practices. However, the 
proper construction of the Act requires that its interpretation 
and application be limited to its reason. 
. . . .  
The Act should be construed in accordance with its under- 
lying purposes and policies. The text of each section should be 
read in the light of the purpose and policy of the rule or princi- 
ple in question, as also of the Act as a whole, and the applica- 
tion of the language should be construed narrowly or broadly, 
as the case may be, in conformity with the purposes and poli- 
cies involved. 
Under the methodology of the common-law tradition that 
also applies to statutory law according to Llewellyn, the critical 
question arises as to the "purpose and policy of the rule or prin- 
ciple in question." Clear expositions of the purposes or policies 
underlying Hadley v. Baxendale are surprisingly elusive. Profes- 
sor Williston states the following about the policies underlying 
the "reason to foresee the harm" rule in Hadley: 
The true reason why notice to the defendant of the plain- 
tiffs special circumstances is important is because, just as the 
court of equity under circumstances of hardship arising after 
the formation of a contract may deny specific performance, so 
a court of law may deny damages for unusual consequences 
where the defendant was not aware when he entered into the 
contract how serious'an injury would result from its breach. 
The defendant is charged with the apparent value of the per- 
formance that he promised, not with what ultimately proves to 
be its value.67 
The Williston rationale can be applied to the situation of 
Heat Treater and Auto Company. Heat Treater is charged with 
the apparent value of the service or goods that it promised. It 
based the price for which it agreed to furnish the goods or ser- 
vice upon their apparent value. If it was reasonably apprised of 
the unusual consequential injury for which it would be accounta- 
ble, such as recall expenditures, it might: (a) refuse to enter into 
such an agreement; (b) charge more for its performance to com- 
67. 11 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1357 at 295 (3d ed. 1968). 
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pensate it for the additional risk; (c) contract expressly with 
plaintiff (Auto Company) that it will not be accountable for such 
additional risk;" or (d) contract anyway without charging more 
or limiting its liabilities by contract, but taking its chances that 
the injury will not occur. Accordingly, Auto Company will take 
the position that the policy underlying Hadley, according to 
Williston, is fulfilled if Heat Treater had reason to foresee the 
risk of the recall but voluntarily contracted. It is thus fairly 
charged with the apparent value of its performance including 
risks of recall. If it therefore wishes to take its chances that re- 
call expenses will not arise, it should be able to do so. 
Heat Treater would presumably respond to Auto Com- 
pany's position that the "true reason" for requiring notice of 
special circumstances (the special circumstances in this instance 
being a recall campaign) is that a defendant may be "charged 
with the apparent value of the performance that he promised." 
Consequently, defendant would have an opportunity to choose 
among these alternatives: (a) refusing to contract, (b) charging 
more to compensate for the additional risk if it does contract, (c) 
contracting to limit the risk, or (d) contracting without charging 
more for the risk and electing to take its chances that recall ex- 
penses will not arise. What happens, however, if most of Heat 
Treater's business is with Auto Company? In light of the dispa- 
rate bargaining power, Heat Treater really does not have a free 
choice whether to charge for the risk, to contractually limit its 
liability, or to refuse to sell. 
Professor Havighurst stated the problem of unequal bar- 
gaining power this way: 
The donkey who is offered the carrot has no real choice unless 
he is well-fed or has other means of nourishment available. If 
he is starving, he must move when offered the carrot more 
surely than he is required to do so when threatened with the 
stick. This thought was expressed two hundred years ago by 
Lord Chancellor Northington-with reference to men, not don- 
keys-when he said that "necessitous men are not, truly speak- 
ing, free men."69 
Continuing its argument, Heat Treater concedes that it may be 
fair to charge defendant with the apparent value of its perform- 
ance (including recall expenses if defendant has notice of plain- 
68. See 190 U.S. at 545. 
69. H. HAVIGHURST, THE NATURE OF PRIVATE CONTRACT 31 (1961). 
516 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I980 
tiffs special circumstances) where defendant has an actual 
choice between selling or not selling to a particular buyer. But, 
Heat Treater argues, it is not fair to so charge if it has no other 
realistic choice. Necessitous men may engage in imprudent 
commitments. 
Moreover, Heat Treater will take a broader view of the 
policy underlying Hadley in the view expressed by Fuller and 
Perdue. They state: 
The [Hadley] case may be said to stand for two proposi- 
tions: (1) that it is not always wise to make the defaulting 
promisor pay for all the damage which follows as a conse- 
quence of his breach, and (2) that specifically the proper test 
for determining whether particular items of damage should be 
compensable is to inquire whether they should have been fore- 
seen by the promisor at the time of the contract. The first as- 
pect of the case is much more important than the second. . . . 
It  declares in effect that just as it is wise to refuse enforcement 
altogether to some promises (considerationless, unaccepted, 
"social" promises, etc.) so it is wise not to go too far in enforc- 
ing those promises which are deemed worthy of legal sanction. 
In its second aspect Hadley u. Baxendale may be regarded 
as giving a grossly simplified answer to the question which its 
first aspect presents. To the question, how far shall we go in 
charging to the defaulting promisor the consequences of his 
breach, it answers with what purports to be a single test, that 
of foreseeability. The simplicity and comprehensiveness of this 
test are largely a matter of illusion. . . . As in the case of all 
"reasonable man" standards there is an element of circularity 
about the test of foreseeability. "For what items of damage 
should the court hold the defaulting promisor? Those which he 
should as a reasonable man have foreseen. But what should he 
have foreseen as a reasonable man? Those items of damage for 
which the court feels he ought to pay." The test of foreseeabil- 
ity is therefore subject to manipulation by the simple device of 
defining the characteristics of the hypothetical man who is do- 
ing the foreseeing. By a gradual process of judicial inclusion 
and exclusion this "man" acquires a complex personality; we 
begin to know just what "he" can "foresee" in this and that 
situation, and we end, not with one test but with a whole set of 
tests. This has obviously happened in the law of negligence, 
and it is happening, although less obviously, to the reasonable 
4851 CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES 517 
man postulated by Hadley v. B a ~ e n d a l e . ~ ~  
According to Fuller and Perdue, Heat Treater would ad- 
vance this argument about the policy of Hadley: The test of 
foreseeability is a cover for a developing set of tests. The stan- 
dard is "reason to foresee," which interjects the "reasonable 
man" concept. Consequently, the one test of foreseeability is in 
reality a whole set of tests directed toward resolving questions 
arising from the proposition "that it is not always wise to make 
the defaulting promisor pay for all the damage which follows as 
a consequence of his breach? Or, as Ffler and Perdue suc- 
cinctly state: "[Hadley is] a compromise between no enforce- 
ment and complete but too onerous enforcement of the promise. 
. . . [Tlhe test of foreseeability is permitted to obscure the more 
fundamental implication of the case, which is that it is unwise to 
impose too onerous consequences on breach of contract."lP 
70. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 63, at 84, 85. 
When we import into a question of liability the "reasonable man" stan- 
dard we do at least two things. In the first place we increase the chance that 
the case will ultimately be determined by the jury. . . . In the second place, 
whether the case is ultimately decided by the judge or the jury, stating the 
problem in terms of the reasonable man creates a bias in favor of exempting 
normal or average conduct from legal penalties. The reasonable man is not 
necessarily the average man, but he tends to be, and the notion of what is 
normal and average puts a bridle on the judicial power of defining reasonable- 
ness. But the restraint is far from complete. I t  becomea illusory in those situa- 
tions where the concepts "normal" and "average" are without definite content; 
where the "average man" is as much a juristic construct as the "reasonable 
man." The restraint is often thrown off even in those fields where, because 
rather definite lay ways of thought and action are discoverable in them, the 
notion of the "normal" and "average" has some objective reality. The courts 
have not hesitated to invest the reasonable man with capacities either greater 
or less than those of the average man. For an example of this judicial auton- 
omy within the reign of fact one need look no further than the case which 
originated the test of foreseeability, Hadley u. Boxendale itself. 
Id. at 85, 86. 
The above points out perhaps the most important practical consideration of this 
paper. That is, the test of "reason to foresee" is likely to be a jury question. Further- 
more, a jury will likely be influenced by such facts as (1) Heat Treater is small while 
Auto Company is large; (2) Heat Treater could probably not bear the recall expenses 
without suffering economic disaster; and (3) Auto Company can bear such expenses and 
add them to the cost of its product. Consequently, the jury, influenced by such facts, 
could determine that Heat Treater did not have reason to foresee the recall. 
71. Id. at 84. 
72. Id. at 87. Compare U.C.C. g 2-615 (Excuse by Failure of Presupposed Condi- 
tions), Comment 1, which states. "This section excuses a seller from timely delivery of 
goods contracted for, where his performance has become commercially impracticable be- 
cause of unforeseen supervening circumstances not within the contemplation of the par- 
ties at the time of contracting." (Emphasis added) Further, note R. NORDSTROM, LAW OF 
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The above argument portrays the foreseeability test as a 
cover for a set of underlying tests. But what is the set of tests 
that the "reasonable man" will apply in determining the wisdom 
of either allowing or disallowing plaintiff all the damages that 
follow as a consequence of defendant's breach? Clearly, the fac- 
tors described earlier in this article provide the basis for this set 
of tests. 
Heat Treater would refer at this point to Professor Llewel- 
lyn's tests for precedent which reflect the common-law (and 
U.C.C.) methodology that a "rule" such as Hadley applied to a 
particular fact situation must make good sense. In this situation 
it does not. On the one hand, although Heat Treater may have 
reason to foresee the recall, it has no real choice. If it wishes to 
stay in business, it must sell to Auto Company and forgo adding 
the risk of recall expenditures to its price. This course is the 
only one open to it, even though damages sustained in a recall, if 
recovered against it, may well put it out of business. On the 
other hand, Auto Company can spread the risk of recall expend- 
itures among its customers. The Hadley principle of "compro- 
mise between no enforcement and complete but too onerous en- 
forcement of the promise'w8 of defendant is fulfilled by dowing 
Auto Company to recover ordinary damages (e.g., the difference 
between the value of goods or services warranted and the 
value as they actually are) but not special damages covering ex- 
penses of the recall campaign. 
A rule disallowing Auto Company all damages in the cir- 
cumstances described above, even though those circumstances 
may have been foreseen by Heat Treater, is within the method- 
ology of the common law (and the U.C.C.), wherein "rules" are 
adapted to meet new circumstances that were unforeseen when 
the rule was first promulgated. 
SALES 8 107 (1970), which states that: 
The Code contains three sections [including 2-6151 which state general 
principles relieving the seller from full performance of his contractual obliga- 
tions. They can be rationalized within the law of contracta in several ways. 
They can be explained under the language of excuse, impossibility, impractica- 
bility, or even implied promise or condition. The most accurate way, however, 
to explain these sections is to consider the risks which the parties shifted by 
their agreement. (Emphasis added) 
73. Fuller & Purdue, supra note 63, at 87. 
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES 
IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
A. Forecasting Results of Litigation 
The preceding section has identified and examined the fac- 
tors that courts will undoubtedly consider in product recall 
cases. Although there hae been a dearth of case authority con- 
cerning this recall-expenditures-as-consequential-damages issue, 
the case authority that does exist and the comments by leading 
scholars indicate a sufliciently clear pattern to permit forecast- 
ing the results of future product recall cases. Aside from the 
question of foreseeability of harm, Heat Treater likely will not 
have a legal obligation to Auto Company for expenditures in- 
volved in a recall campaign in the following circumstances: 
1. Heat Treater is not compensated for the risk; the greater 
the compensation, the greater the likelihood of liability. 
2. A gross disparity exists between the compensation received 
by Heat Treater and the damages sought by Auto Company. 
The smaller the disparity, the greater the likelihood of liability. 
3. The defect giving rise to the recall occurred even though 
Heat Treater was not at fault. The relative difliculty of avoid- 
ing defects is a factor in determining fault. The greater the de- 
gree of fault, the greater the likelihood of liability. 
4. Auto Company wields the principal bargaining power. 
Since it uses a form contract and chooses the language of the 
contract, it could have clarified the ambiguity concerning recall 
damages. Consequently, in the absence of such clarification, 
Auto Company is likely to bear the risk of recall expenditures. 
5. Auto Company is in the best position to bear the risk of 
the recall expenditures if: 
(a) Heat Treater is an economically small unit; 
(b) Heat Treater does all or most of its business with 
Auto Company; 
(c) Heat Treater's potential liability for recall costs is 
not subject to any degree of calculation that would per- 
mit it to obtain insurance or set aside a reserve fund 
that would be recognized for tax purposes; 
(d) The potential liability to Heat Treater is so great 
that imposing such liability upon it would probably 
spell economic disaster; and 
(e) Auto Company can spread the costs of the recall 
among its automobile purchasers. The greater the size 
of Heat Treater as an economic unit, the less is its de- 
pendence on Auto Company for its survival, and the 
greater is the likelihood of its liability. A decrease in 
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Heat Treater's dependence on Auto Company would 
strengthen the argument that it is in a position eco- 
nomically to bear the risk of the recall. 
Subsequent to the original study, some developments have 
occurred that validate these factors. Three cases involving recov- 
ery of consequential damages for product recall expenditures 
have been decided. Two of the cases involved government con- 
tracts; the other involved a regular commercial contract. In addi- 
tion, section 351 of Restatement (Second) of Contracts, entitled 
"Unforeseeability and Related Limitations in Damages," has 
been promulgated by the American Law Institute. 
B. The Aerodex and Franklin Cases 
In United States u. Aerodex, Inc.,14 Aerodex contracted to 
sell to the United States Department of the Navy 300 new, un- 
used master rod bearings, part number 171815 at a cost of $90 
each, totaling $27,000. The bearings supplied by Aerodex to the 
Navy were not part number 171815 but part numbers 117971 
and 117971Y10, which had been reworked by Aerodex. The re- 
worked bearings were received and accepted by the Navy with- 
out the "100% final inspection" required by the contract. A 
number of them were installed in aircraft engines. When the 
Navy discovered that the bearings were not the ones contracted 
for, it removed and replaced those that had been installed at a 
cost of $160,919.76 
The district court held that Aerodex was liable under the 
Federal False Claims Acte7@ The Fifth Circuit aftirmed, holding 
that the deliberate mislabeling, coupled with the fact that the 
delivered parts did not actually meet the specifications of the 
contract, compelled a finding of liability under the Act. Further- 
more, the court stated that the government's failure to inspect 
did not insulate Aerodex from liability for its own fraud.17 The 
measure of damages under the False Claims Act was twice the 
purchase price of $27,000 plus $6,000 in penal tie^.^' 
With regard to the recovery of the $160,919 cost of the "re- 
trofit" operation as consequential damages, the court ruled that 
74. 469 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1972). 
75. Id. at 1006. 
76. 31 U.S.C. $ 231 (1976). 
77. 469 F.2d at 1010. 
78. Id. at 1011. 
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Aerodex was liable for breach of warranty unless it could estab- 
lish an adequate defense? Aerodex's main defense was that the 
government's failure to conduct the "100% final inspection" 
precluded it from any remedy for the breach of warranty. The 
court responded: 
These arguments are irrelevant because the breached war- 
ranty was an express one. Aerodex expressly warranted that 
the delivered bearings were of a specific serial number, when in 
truth they were not. . . . The government was therefore en- 
titled to rely solely upon Aerodex's express warranty describing 
the bearings, and its failure to inspect the delivered bearings is 
of no legal consequen~e.~~ 
The court entered judgment of $160,919 for consequential dam- 
ages in addition to the $60,000 award under the False Claims 
Act? 
Nowhere in its opinion did the court of appeals cite author- 
ity for its decision to award consequential damages. The district 
court, however, had noted that 
[tlhe costs incurred by the United States in the recall and re- 
. trofit of engines in which discrepant bearings had been in- 
stalled were a direct and natural consequence of the deception 
practiced by the defendantsees 
Although the district court did not give authority for its state- 
ment, its emphasized language is Hadley u. Baxendale phrase- 
ology. The court apparently followed the common law (and 
U.C.C.) rule of reason to know or foresee. 
In a second case, United States u. Franklin Steel Products, 
Inc.," the district court faced facts strikingly similar to those of 
Aerodex. Franklin Steel contracted to deliver to the Navy new 
engine rod bearings, part number 17 181 5, but instead delivered 
reworked bearings that did not conform to specifications. Al- 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 1012. One of Aerodex's supporting arguments was that the damages were 
not foreseeable (Hadley u. Baxendale) since Aerodex could not have known that the 
government would not make the required inspections. In other words, Aerodex argued 
that the government should be liable for not protecting itself from Aerodex's own fraud. 
The argument is audacious at best. The law does not encourage fraudulence; a fraud 
cannot hide behind the argument that another could have discovered the fraud had he 
only been more careful. 
81. Id. at 1013. 
82. United States v. Aerodex, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 1027, 1031 (S.D. Fla. 1970) (empha- 
sis added). 
83. 482 F.2d 400 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1973). 
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though the Navy was obligated under the contract to inspect the 
bearings before installation, it failed to do so. The defect was 
discovered after installation. Because of the "enormity of the 
hazard" to its pilots, the Navy refitted the engines with new 
bearings at a cost of $147,060? 
The district court held that Franklin was not liable on the 
ground that the Navy's duty to inspect superseded Franklin's 
warranty  provision^.^^ The Ninth Circuit reversed. The court 
stated, quoting from the contract, that even if the government 
had an obligation to inspect, "inspection and subsequent accept- 
ance are not conclusive 'as regards latent defects, fraud, or such 
gross mistakes as to amount to fraud.' "86 The court concluded: 
Finally, we must decide the measure of damages awardable 
to the government. The main issue presented is whether in ad- 
dition to the contract price paid for the discrepant bearings 
($28,890) the government may recover consequential damages 
for the retrofit operation ($147,060). In Aerodex, supra the 
government was permitted to recover both such damages. 
While in Aerodex, the court held that the contractor was also 
liable for fraud, for purposes of damages, that factor does not 
differentiate our case from Aerodex since the contracts here 
treat breaches involving fraud and latent defects alike. 
We agree again with Aerodex in holding that Franklin is 
liable for all damages which are the direct and proximate result 
of the breach of 
84. Id. at  402-03. 
85. Id. at  403. 
86. Id. Footnote 3 in the court's opinion states: 
The facts of the case suggest that the government could have charged the con- 
tractor with fraud or gross mistakes as to amount to fraud in light of the coun- 
terfeit nature of the bearings. See United States v. Aerodex, supra. However, 
since the government did not argue this theory, we do not consider it on this 
appeal. 
Id. Footnote 4 then states: 
Simple, inexpensive, nondestructive tests exist by which the government could 
have discovered these deficiencies, but such tests were not specified in the con- 
tract. The government had every right to rely on Franklin's express warranty 
that the bearings would conform to the specifications. . . . While the govern- 
ment may have been "contributorily negligent" in not conducting a more thor- 
ough inspection, that is not a defense to a breach of warranty claim. Brown v. 
Chapman, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962). 
Id. 
87. Id. at  404,405. The language of this sentence is traditional common law liability 
for consequential damages as spelled out in RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS 5 330 (1932) and 
U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a). Point Adams Packing Co. v. Astoria Marine Construction Co., 594 
F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1979) states in part  "[Tlhe decision in Franklin Steel was apparently 
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C. Commentary on Aerodex and Franklin 
These two cases present the same issues. The only distinc- 
tion between them is that the contractor in Aerodex was also 
held liable for fraud? In both cases the government recovered 
the costs of the recall as consequential damages. Both cases pro- 
vide little or no discussion of why the defendants had reason to 
foresee the product recall. This lack of explanation is not un- 
usual in consequential damages cases. The factors discussed in 
Part I11 of this article may be relevant in forecasting the results 
of litigation concerning the Hadley rule. 
In Aerodex the defendant received $27,000 for the sale of 
the bearings and suffered consequential damages for the recall 
amounting to $160,919.18. Consequential damages were 5.96 
times the compensation received by Aerodex. In Franklin the 
defendant received $28,890 for the sale of the bearings and 
suffered consequential damages for the recall amounting to 
$147,060. Consequential damages were 5.09 times the compensa- 
tion received by Franklin. 
In Aerodex the breach was willful and Aerodex was held lia- 
ble for fraud under the False Claims Act.@@ In Franklin the 
"facts of the case suggest[ed] that the government could have 
charged the contractor with fraud or gross mistakes as amount 
to fraud in light of the counterfeit nature of the bearings."@O 
In both Aerodex and Franklin, the ratio of consequential 
damages sought to compensation received was between five and 
six to one. The respective courts apparently did not believe this 
to be a gross differential, especially in light of the willfulness of 
the fraudulent breaches. In addition, the courts recognized that 
a failure of the bearing would have led to engine failure and en- 
dangered both the aircraft and pilots. In short, one who know- 
ingly contracts to deliver nonconforming bearings to the govern- 
ment for the purpose of obtaining excessive profits, thereby 
imperiling aircraft, military personnel and even the nation's se- 
curity, will be adjudged to have reasonably foreseen a wide scope 
of consequential damages.@' 
not controlled by the U.C.C. as this case is." Id. at 766 n.4. 
88. 482 F.2d at 403 n.2. 
89. 31 U.S.C. $ 231 (1976). 
90. 482 F.2d at 403 n.2. 
91. See generally Note, Post Acceptance Liability in Defense Supply Contracting, 
56 VA. L. REV. 923 (1970). 
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D. The Chris-Craft Case 
Taylor & Gaskin, Inc. v. Chris-Craft Industries, I n P  is 
presumably the first reported case to address the questions 
raised by the Heat Treater and Auto Company hypotheti~al.~~ 
In Chris-Craft the buyer (Chris-Craft), using its purchase order 
form, ordered gas tanks from the seller (Taylor & Gaskin) for its 
inboard pleasure cruiser, the MXA-25 Express Cruiser. The 
tanks were to be finished with "epoxy coating inside, paint red 
outside."" The purchase order was accompanied by a print that 
changed the design of the tank to require the addition of two 
mounting brackets, or "chocks." The print gave no directions 
with respect to the method of paint application, but the buyer 
did specify the type of tank finish to be used.@' Seller shipped 
the gas tanks and buyer installed them in its pleasure cruisers. 
Buyer subsequently received complaints of rusting tanks. It no- 
tified seller of these complaints and suggested to seller a joint 
recall campaign? Seller replied that any responsibility for tank 
problems was solely attributable to buyer. Buyer initiated a re- 
call campaign and all but 160 of 550 tanks were replaced with 
hot-dipped galvanized t a n b n  Buyer then sought to recover 
92. No. 75-71030 (E.D. Mich., Jan. 31,1980). Aerodex and Franklin are government 
contract cases involving a recall by the ultimate consumer. Chris-Craft is a regular com- 
mercial contract case where the manufacturer of the end product recalls and seeks recov- 
ery from its supplier. 
93. See Part I1 supra. 
94. "While Chris-Craft had utilized painted steel tanks in diesel boats prior to 1972, 
it had never purchased a painted steel gasoline tank." [Finding of Fact No. 4.1 "Both Mr. 
Densmore [of Chris-Craft] and Mr. Wilkins [of Taylor & Gaskin] were aware that certain 
manufacturers were using an epoxy-coated slush compound tank. Chris-Craft had never 
purchased such a tank and Taylor & Gaskin had never manufactured a tank of this 
type." [Finding of Fact No. 11.1 No. 75-71030, slip op. at 3, 4. 
95. It should be noted that seller had previously quoted a price for hot-dipped gal- 
vanized tanks. Buyer inquired whether it was possible to obtain a lower cost and was 
told that ten dollars per tank could be saved by the epoxy coating inside and red paint 
outside. Such a tank received the approval of the Boating Industry Association on the 
basis that the tanks were to be covered with 1% mils of paint and would therefore be 
"equivalent" to the hot-dipped galvanized tanks. Neither the Boating Industry Associa- 
tion nor buyer or seller performed corrosion tests on the painted tanks. Seller privately 
questioned the ability of the tanks to resist corrosion but did not communicate its mis- 
givings to buyer. Subsequently, the Boating Industry Association deleted all painted 
steel tanks from its accepted type list and required that all steel tanks be hot-dipped 
galvanized. 
96. Finding of Fact No. 31D, No. 75-71030, slip op. at  7. 
97. The Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971 states: 
§ 1464. Repair or replacement of defects; Notification by manufacturer; 
Time limitation 
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damages from seller, including those damages attributable to the 
recall campaign. 
The district court concluded that the contract contained 
both an express warranty and an implied warranty of 
merchantability. But seller maintained that it had complied 
with buyer's specifications. It painted the tanks red in accor- 
dance with the Boating Industry Association's requirement that 
the tanks be covered with 1% mils of paintY Buyer responded 
that the principal breach by seller was the failure to apply more 
than one coat of paint, which created gaps in the paint surface. 
The gaps caused a greater vulnerability to penetration of the 
paint and consequent rusting within two months of installation. 
The court concluded: 
The testimony of [Buyer's] expert . . . established that 
the tank would begin rusting at one to two months and would 
rust through in two years. Such evidence is s a c i e n t  to prove 
that the tanks were not merchantable at the time they left the 
control of the manufacturer, that is that they were not fit for 
the ordinary purpose of holding fuel in a marine environment, 
(a) Every manufacturer who discovers or acquires information which he 
determines, in the exercise of reasonable and prudent judgment, indicates that 
a boat or associated equipment subject to an applicable standard or regulation 
prescribed pursuant to section 1454 of this title either fails to comply with 
such standard or regulation, or contains a defect which creates a substantial 
risk of persoizal injury to the public, shall, if such boat or associated equip- 
ment has left the place of manufacture, furnish notification of such defect or 
failure of compliance as provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, 
within a reasonable time after the manufacturer has discovered the defect: 
Provided, That the manufacturer's duty of notification under subsection (b)(l) 
and subsection (b)(2) of this section applies only to defects or failures of cem- 
pliance discovered by the manufacturer within one of the following periods, as 
appropriate: 
(1) in the case of a boat or associated equipment required by regulation to 
have a date of certification aflixed, five years from date of certification, or 
(2) in the case of a boat or associated equipment not required by regula- 
tion to have a date of certification aflixed, five years from date of manufacture. 
. . . . 
(c) . . . The notification required by subsection (a) of this section shall 
contain a clear description of such defect or failure to comply, an evaluation of 
the hazard reasonably related thereto, a statement of the measures to be taken 
to correct such defect or failure to comply, and an undertaking by the manu- 
facturer to take such measures at his sole cost and expense. 
46 U.S.C. $5 1451, 1464 (emphasis added). 
98. Buyer did not seriously claim that the paint thickness did not comply with 
Boating Association requirements for thickness. Taylor & Gaskin, Inc. v. Chris-Craft 
Indus., Inc., No. 75-71030, slip op. at  21 (E.D. Mich., Jan. 31, 1980). 
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U.C.C. 2-314." 
Buyer further contended that seller was negligent in the de- 
sign, construction, or selection of materials used in the tanks or 
that it had failed to properly test the materials selected for use. 
In agreement with buyer's argument, the court noted that seller 
had used only one coat of paint even though it was aware of the 
tanks' susceptibility to rust. Furthermore, seller had neither dis- 
cussed with the buyer its apprehensions about the tanks' possi- 
ble failure nor performed any corrosion resistance tests. The 
court concluded: 
The failure of [seller] to test for corrosion, to warn of a 
foreseeable failure andlor to take steps in the manufacturing 
process to reduce susceptibility consistent with the specifica- 
tions, that is by two coats of paint, all may be said to be negli- 
gence in the manufacture of the tank.loO 
The court rejected seller's argument that buyer could not re- 
cover because of contributory negligence, reasoning that 
"[buyer] need not establish that [seller's] negligence was the sole 
proximate cause of its injury."lol The court awarded buyer 
$25,114.58, the amount apparently paid for the tanks.lo2 
The court dealt at some length with the issue of recovery of 
recall expenditures as consequential damages. Since this is the 
first judicial utterance concerning this matter, it is recited essen- 
tially verbatim as follows: 
Several considerations support the conclusion that [buyer] 
may not recover as consequential damages the cost of replace- 
ment of the subject tanks and other costs incident to the recall. 
First, [buyer] has failed to present any evidence that the 
costs of recall were within the reasonable contemplation of the 
parties, either by applicable industry regulations or trade prac- 
tice and custom, see generally B. Stone, Product Recall and 
Consequential Damages, (1971).loa 
Thus, the evidence does not establish that total replace- 
ment was reasonably within the contemplation of the parties at 
the time of contracting. 
[Buyer] selected the painted exterior for competitive rea- 
sons and chose to install the tank where it would be vulnerable 
99. Id. at 22. 
100. Id. at 22-23. 
101. Id. at 23. 
102. Id. at 24. See generally U.C.C. g 2-714(2). 
103. This article ia a condensation md update of the cited report. See note 3 supra. 
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to bilge water. Although aware of the susceptibility to corro- 
sion of painted surfaces and in possession of the prototype 
tank, [buyer] failed to perform corrosion tests and apparently 
failed to test the tank in the prototype boat. Having done so, 
[buyer] cannot now be permitted to transfer the costs incident 
to its experimentation by a claim that the buyer at the time of 
entering into the contract "communicated sufficient facts to 
make it apparent that the damages subsequently claimed were 
within the reasonable contemplation of the parties. . . ." 
Similarly, analyzed in terms of [seller's] negligence, 
[buyer] should not be permitted to recover for those damages 
not proximately caused by [seller's] negligence or caused by 
[buyer's] own negligence or fault. . . . 
Section 2-715(2)(b) [of the U.C.C.] requires that recover- 
able consequential damages are limited to losses "proximately 
resulting" from the breach of warranty.'* 
While I have credited the testimony that the tanks would 
have failed at two years, the evidence shows that rusting is also 
attributed to faulty installation, design of the support chocks 
and location of the tanks in the boat. The evidence does not 
establish that removal and replacement of all 550 tanks was 
"proximately caused" by [seller's] breach.lo6 
. . . . 
. . . [After examining the evidence,] I cannot conclude that 
the breach proximately caused the necessity to recall and re- 
place all the tanks and the costs incidental thereto. Moreover, 
nothing in the contract itself indicates that the parties contem- 
plated that [seller] bear the risk of such damages. . . . 
[Buyer] chose the words of the warranty, and had it 
wished to spell out that the risk of recall would be borne by 
[seller], it could have done so.'"@ As between the two parties, 
104. It is submitted that recall of defective components involves economic loss and 
that the test is not proximate causation but rather "reason to foresee." Compare U.C.C. 
5 2-715(2)(a) with id. Q 2-715 (2)(b). 
105. Not only must there be an appropriate causal relationship between a defective 
product and a product recall, the buyer has a duty to mitigate losses. For example, 
U.C.C. 5 2-715 (2)(a) allows a recovery for foreseeable consequential damages for "any 
loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs . . . which could not 
reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise." 
106. Although "spelling out the risk" is suggested by Judge Boyle as the solution, 
this may lead to other problems. Courts often strike down provisions allocating risk as 
unclear, even though the risks were very clearly spelled out. In this regard, Llewellyn has 
stated: 
We have all of us seen this kind of series of cases, haven't we? Case No. 1 
comes up. The clause is perfectly clear and the court said "Had it been desired 
to provide such an unbelievable thing, surely language could have been made 
clearer." The counsel redrafts, and they not only say it twice as well, but they 
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[buyer] was in a stronger bargaining position and opted for 
production of an untried and cheaper tank, a risk which they 
now seek to transfer in toto to [seller] although they did not 
make [seller] aware of their particular requirements for use of 
the tank. 
. . . . 
Accordingly, I conclude that this is not a "proper case" for 
the imposition of incidental and consequential damages at- 
tendant to the recall.lo7 
E. Commentary on Chris-Craft 
Unlike the plaintiffs in Aerodex and Franklin, Chris-Craft 
did not recover costs of the recall. The reason for the difference 
in outcomes is tied to one main factual distinction. Although 
Taylor & Gaskin (seller) breached warranties and was even neg- 
ligent, it was not dealing in a fraudulent manner as were the 
sellers in Aerodex and Franklin. Except for this difference, the 
other facts are quite similar. For example, the disparity between 
compensation received for the sale of goods and consequential 
damages sought was nearly the same in all three cases. In Aer- 
odex and Franklin the ratio was between five and six to one, and 
in Chris-Craft it was 6.84 to one.lo8 
wind up saying, "And we mean it," and the court looks at it a second time and 
says, "Had this been the kind of thing really intended to go into an agreement, 
surely language could have been found," and so on down the line. 
1 N.Y. Law REVISION COMMISSION REPORT 177-78 (1954). Llewellyn made the statement 
in the context of unconscionable clauses, implying that the real reason for the rejection 
was unconscionability. Basic contract law recognizes this problem in the rule that a term 
in a standardized agreement will not be enforced if the adversely affected party would 
not have entered into the contract had it known of the term. See RXSTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS 8 211 (1981) on standardized agreements. 
107. No. 75-71030, slip op. at 27-29 (citations omitted). 
108. Compensation received by Taylor & Gaskin for the tanks amounted to 
$25,114.58; recall expenditures incurred by Chrii-Craft, as set out in its trial brief, were: 
B. Cwt of replacement fuel tanks $56,477.50 
C. Cost of replacement kits used by 
dealers to install the replacement tanks. 4,306.61 
D. Freight charges: 
1. Drake to Chris-Craft 1,690.93 
2. Chris-Craft to dealers 6,858.54 
E. Warranty claims from dealers for 
labor in replacing tanks. 71,388.68 
F. Incidental expenses in connection 
with examinkion, inspection and 
recall of tanks. 
G. Overhead expenses. 
Total 
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In Chris-Craft the court found that buyer "failed to present 
any evidence that the costs of recall were in the reasonable con- 
templation of the parties."lO@ Yet, the court could just as well 
have found that seller knew that the tanks would rust and that a 
rusting tank with even a pinhole break could cause fumes to es- 
cape and result in an explosion. Consequently, such a safety-re- 
lated defect would foreseeably trigger a recall as the probable 
result of the breach.l1° The court also noted that buyer was in a 
superior bargaining position and "had it wished to spell out that 
the risk of recall would be borne by Taylor & Gaskin, it could 
have done so."ll1 "[Nlothing in the contract itself indicates that 
the parties contemplated that Taylor & Gaskin bear the risk of 
such damages."ll' Ostensibly for lack of contemplation the court 
would not award consequential damages. 
Another issue mentioned by the court, which relates to its 
refusal to award consequential damages, was causation. The 
court observed that rusting was in part attributable to faulty in- 
stallation, inferior design of the support chocks, and improper 
location of the tanks in the boat. It further noted that although 
buyer was aware of the susceptibility of painted surfaces to cor- 
rosion, buyer (as did seller) failed to perform corrosion tests. 
What was apparently bothering the court in this opinion113 
was the perception that buyer, for competitive reasons, unneces- 
sarily cut a corner on a safety-related item to save ten dollars 
and then wanted seller to pay' for the whole loss. The court 
reasoned: 
As between the two parties, Chris-Craft was in a stronger bar- 
gaining position and opted for production of an untried and 
cheaper tank, a risk which they now seek to transfer in toto to 
Taylor & Gaskin although they did not make Taylor & Gaskin 
aware of their particular requirements for use of the tank. 
. . . In short, it cannot fairly be said that a reasonable per- 
son would have contemplated at the time of contracting that 
the entire result of a recall campaign would ultimately be 
109. No. 75-71030, slip op. at 27. 
110. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 (1981). 
111. No. 75-71030, slip op. at 29. 
112. Id. 
113. In forecasting the likely outcome of a case, Professor Llewellyn has suggested 
that a lawyer shift his focus from what was held in a series of opinions-to be relied 
upon as precedent--% what those opinions suggest or show about what was bothering 
and what was helping the court as it decided." K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 51, at 178. 
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borne by the manufacturer . . . . 114 
If the court was faced with an all or nothing choice of who 
would bear the expense of the recall, the Chris-Craft result 
seems reasonable when judged by the factors articulated earlier. 
Even though seller was negligent, buyer's conduct was not be- 
yond reproach. Also, the disparity between compensation re- 
ceived by seller and the costs of the recall, although not grossly 
disproportionate, were nevertheless considerable.l16 Buyer could 
have indicated in its purchase order who would bear the recall 
expenses, but it did not. And the causal link between the defec- 
tive tanks and the recall is not absolute (e.g., there may have 
been faulty installation). 
The court asserted that buyer's contributory negligence "is 
not a bar to recovery since, if the manufacturer's breach of duty 
was a proximate cause of the injury, both Michigan and Florida 
law allow recovery of that proportion of damages attributable to 
the breach. Jorae v. Clinton Crop Service, 465 F. Supp. 952 
(E.D. Mich. 1979), Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431 (1973)."L16 
Jorae applied the Michigan comparative negligence statute 
which will be discussed later.l17 The court never really explained 
the significance of this proposition. Perhaps the allocation al- 
luded to was entailed in their holding that Taylor & Gaskin be 
liable for direct damages ($25,114.58) and that Chris-Craft be 
liable for consequential damages ($171,722.26).l18 
F. Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 351 
The new Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 351 en- 
titled "Unforeseeability and Related Limitations on Damages," 
constitutes a significant development in the law of consequential 
damages.llS Subsections (1) and (2) essentially reiterate the 
Hadley v. Baxendale rule.laO Subsection (3), however, is new and 
114. No. 75-71030, slip op. at 29 (emphasis added). 
115. Further, there was no indication in the case that seller was compensated for 
assuming the risk of a product recall. It is surmised that seller was not so compensated. 
116. No. 75-710030, slip op. at 23. 
117. See note 132 and accompanying text infra. 
118. With the promulgation of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS section 351 
and comment f, to be discussed at Part III F infra, it is suggested that courts will now be 
encouraged to view allocation of risk between seller and buyer as another solution to 
these matters. 
119. See 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS 88 1006-1019 (1964); 11 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 
$5 1344-1344A, 1347, 1355-1357 (3d ed. 1968). 
120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 5 351(1) and (2) (1981) state: 
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES 
states: 
A court may limit damages for foreseeable loss by exclud- 
ing recovery for loss of profits, by allowing recovery only for 
loss incurred in reliance, or otherwise if i t  concludes that in the 
circumstances justice so requires in order to avoid dispropor- 
tionate compensation.ltl 
1. Damages are not recoverable for loss that the party in breach did not have 
reason to foresee as a probable result of the breach when the contract was 
made. 
2. Loss may be foreseeable as a probable result of a breach because it follows 
from the breach 
(a) in the ordinary course of events, or 
(b) as a result of special circumstances, beyond the ordinary course 
of events that the party in breach had reason to know. 
The Reporter's Note to these subsections states, "Subsections (1) and (2) are based 
on former Q 330, with changes in language to conform to the language of Uniform Com- 
mercial Code QQ 2-714(1) and 2-715(2)(a)." See U.C.C. Q 2-715, Comment 1. 
121. RE~TATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS Q 351(3) (1981). Comment f to section 
351 states: 
Other limitations on damages. It is not always in the interest of justice to 
require the party in breach to pay damages for all of the foreseeable loss that 
he has caused. There are unusual instances in which it appears from the cir- 
cumstances either that the parties assumed that one of them would not bear 
the risk of a particular loss or that, although there was no such assumption, it 
would be unjust to put the risk on that party. One such circumstance is an 
extreme disproportion between the loss and the price charged by the party 
w h m  liability for that loss is in question. The fact that the price is relatively 
small suggests that it was not intended to cover the risk of such liability. An- 
other such circumstance is an informality of dealing, including the absence of a 
detailed written contract, which indicates that there was no careful attempt to 
allocate all of the risks. The fact that the parties did not attempt to delineate 
with precision all of the risks justifies a court in attempting to allocate them 
fairly. The limitations dealt with in this Section are more likely to be imposed 
in connection with contracts that do not arise in a commercial setting. Typical 
examples of limitations imposed on damages under this discretionary power 
involve the denial of recovery for loss of profits and the restriction of damages 
to loss incurred in reliance on the contract. Sometimes these limits are covertly 
imposed, by means of an especially demanding requirement of foreseeability or 
of certainty. The rule stated in this Section recognizes that what is done in 
such cases is the imposition of a limitation in the interests of justice. 
This comment is followed by two illustrations which involve goods: 
Illustrations: 
17. A, a private trucker, contracts with B to deliver to B's factory a ma- 
chine that has just been repaired and without which B's factory, as A knows, 
cannot reopen. Delivery is delayed because A's truck breaks down. In an action 
by B against A for breach of contract the court may, after taking into consider- 
ation such factors as the absence of an elaborate written contract and the ex- 
treme disproportion between B's loss of profits during the delay and the price 
of the trucker's services, exclude recovery for loss of profits. 
18. A, a retail hardware dealer, contracts to sell B an inexpensive lighting 
attachment, which, as A knows, B needs in order to use his tractor at  night on 
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This new subsection should produce a beneficial effect be- 
cause it allows a court to formally consider factors aside from 
foreseeability in determining the recovery of consequential dam- 
ages.lP2 No longer should courts hesitate because of the espe- 
cially demanding requirement of foreseeability, to articulate the 
factors that actually guide them.laS Courts should be encouraged 
to express their reasons for allowing or disallowing recovery for 
consequential damages.la4 The enunciation of those factors actu- 
ally forming the basis of decisions will advance the quest for 
greater predictability in the law of consequential damages.la5 
Comment f to Restatement section 351 points out two fac- 
tors that may preclude a plaintiff from recovering foreseeable 
consequential damages. The first factor is extreme disproportion 
between the consequential loss and the price charged (an aspect 
of the idea that defendant be compensated for the risk). The 
his farm. A is delayed in obtaining the attachment and, since no substitute is 
available, B is unable to use the tractor at night during the delay. In an action 
by B against A for breach of contract, the court may, after taking into consid- 
eration such factors as the absence of an elaborate written contract and the 
extreme disproportion between B's loss of profits during the delay and the 
price of the attachment, exclude recovery for loss of profits. 
122. "In fact it is highly misleading and pernicious to emphasize [foreseeability] as 
the sole or controlling factor." L. GREEN, supra note 34, at 52. 
123. For example, limits on consequential damages have sometimes been covertly 
imposed by means of an especially demanding requirement of foreseeability. See RE- 
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS $351, Comment f. Llewellyn referred to courts doing 
their work without spelling out the factors that actually guided them as being "like some 
Victorian virgin tubbing in her nightgown." K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 51, at 267. 
124. See K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 51, at 5, 6. 
125. Consider the following analysis of Professor Farnsworth, the Reporter for Re- 
statement (Second) of Contracts: 
A . . . solution [to the problem of determining liability for consequential 
damages] would be to preserve the test of foreseeability as the outer limit of 
liability in contract, but to recognize a judicial prerogative to further reduce 
that liability in the light of a convincing showing that although the conse- 
quences were foreseen, or at least foreseeable, the risk was not assumed by the 
promisor. . . . Factors that might be influential in rebutting such a showing 
would include the ease with which the promisor, such as a carrier or telegraph 
company, might have included an express limitation if it had chosen to do so, 
and the intentional or willful character of the breach. . . . In any event, the 
solution suggested here would have the dual advantage that judicial departure 
from the traditional test of foreseeability would be exceptional, to be made 
only on an &rmative showing of appropriate circumstances, and that it would 
be done overtly without reliance on fiction. 
Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1209-10 
(1970) (footnotes omitted). Note that the solution Professor Farnsworth suggested in his 
capacity as a law review commentator was incorporated into RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS $ 351 by Farnsworth in his capacity as Reporter for the Restatement. 
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second is informality of dealing (including the absence of a de- 
tailed written contract), which reflects the absence of a careful 
attempt to allocate the risk.'" These factors parallel many of 
those set out earlier in this article. 
Comment f also states, "The fact that the parties did not 
attempt to delineate with precision all of the risks justifies a 
court in attempting to allocate them fairly."127 To this point it 
has been assumed that either plaintiff or defendant will bear all 
the consequential damages, but justice may require an alloca- 
tion. Webster defines allocate to mean: 
[T]o distribute or to divide and distribute according to rel- 
ative contribution to an objective whether on an equal, propor- 
tional, or judiciously calculated basis. . . . [T]o apportion and 
distribute (as costs or revenues) among accounts according to 
some predetermined ratio or agreed measure of involvement 
(as degree of responsibility or benefit received.)la8 
Accordingly, justice may require, in accordance with subsection 
(3) of section 351, that the risk be apportioned in some manner 
between plaintiff and defendant. Professor Farnsworth suggests 
this possibility: 
In an appropriate case, it is conceivable that a court might 
even tailor recovery so as to split the risk between the two par- 
ties and meet the objection of one commentator that the tradi- 
tional rule "usually permita only all-or-nothing recovery."12e 
Courts, however, are often reluctant to allocate a risk be- 
tween the litigants. Legislative bodies, it is asserted, are better 
equipped to handle such matters. In response to these percep- 
126. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 5 351, Comment f (1981). 
127. Id. 
128. WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (Unabridged) (1971). 
129. Farnsworth, supra note 125, a t  1209-10. See also Comment, Lost Profits as 
Contract Damages: Problems of Proof and Limitations on Recovery, 65 YALE L.J. 992, 
1020 (1956); Note, The Right to Indemnity in Products Liability Cases, 1964 U .  ILL. 
L.F. 614, which states in part: 
It might be fairer, therefore, [in products liability cases] to permit contribution 
between sellers who have both been found negligent toward third parties. By a 
distribution of half the 1- to each, or even by a distribution of loss in compar- 
ison to relative volumes of business, the loss could be more equitably shared by 
the sellers whose liability has already been established. This argument would 
be particularly persuasive where the retailer is operating a much larger concern 
than his manufacturer. 
Id. at  630-31. 
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tions the case of Placek v. City of Sterling HeightslSo is instruc- 
tive. In Placek the state of Michigan judicially adopted the doc- 
trine of comparative negligence. The Michigan Supreme Court 
discussed whether a judicial forum is the proper forum in which 
to adopt the doctrine of comparative negligence. In its discus- 
sion the court rebutted the three arguments against judicially- 
created comparative negligence. The first argument is that the 
legislature is better equipped to gather facts, understand the na- 
ture of the problem, and arrive at a solution. The rebuttal to 
this argument is that courts have the same access to facts as 
legislatures, that they are particularly sensitive to contributory 
negligence problems, and that they have much experience in ju- 
dicially-created solutions. In the area of comparative negligence, 
courts are better equipped than legislatures to provide solutions 
because "this is preeminently lawyer's law."lS1 
The second argument is that the legislature possesses supe- 
rior ability to enact changes while simultaneously anticipating 
and resolving numerous details and collateral issues. The re- 
sponse is that (a) most comparative negligence statutes are gen- 
eral in nature and leave courts to resolve the details anyway,18= 
and (b) a judicially-fashioned rule can anticipate important 
questions and resolve them in advance, thus avoiding the need 
for future litigation.ls8 
Third, it can be argued that legislative reform affords af- 
fected parties time to prepare for the change of law, which may 
include obtaining insurance or adjusting costs. The rebuttal is 
130. 405 Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979). 
131. Id. at 657-59, 275 N.W.2d at  517-18 (citations omitted) (quoting Fleming, For- 
ward: Comparative Negligence at  Last-By Judicial Choice, 64 C~~IF. L. REV. 239, 279- 
80, 281 (1976)). 
132. For example, Michigan recently enacted a statute dealing with products liabil- 
ity actions that states: 
In all products liability actions brought to recover damages resulting from 
death or injury to person or property, the fact that the plaintiff may have been 
guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery by the plaintiff or the 
plaintiffs legal representatives, but damages sustained by the plaintiff shall be 
diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the 
plaintiff. 
MICH. COW. LAWS ANN. 8 600.2949(1) (1978). It should be noted that not only are com- 
parative negligence statutes in the briefest conceivable form, so is the U.C.C. conse- 
quential damages provision. See U.C.C. 8 2-715(2)(a). This strengthens the argument for 
a judicially-created rule in both comparative negligence and consequential damages. 
133. Admittedly, anticipation of future problems is limited by the rule that courts 
cannot render advisory opinions. Yet a judicially-fashioned rule could take many poten- 
tial problems into account without violating this limitation. 
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that courts "long ago [broke] with the Blackstonian fiction that 
judicial decisions must necessarily be retroactive in 
operation."134 
Like comparative negligence, recovery of consequential 
damages is also "lawyer's law." A court, accordingly, would be 
acting appropriately in allocating recall expenditures between 
the parties "if it concludes that in the circumstances justice so 
requires. "lS5 
But what factors should be used in determining the alloca- 
tion of risk between parties, especially in the product recall sit- 
uation? A starting point may be to reiterate one of Webster's 
definitions of allocate: "to apportion and distribute (as costs or 
revenues) among accounts according to some predetermined ra- 
tio or agreed measure of involvement (as degree of responsibility 
or benefit receiued)."lS6 
Some relevant factors to be considered include (1) the rela- 
tive degree of fault, if any, attributable to each party (degree of 
responsibility); (2) the parties' relative volumes of business (de- 
gree of benefit received)'"; and, (3) the relative profit expecta- 
tion of each party (again, degree of benefit received). The 
author, in a 1975 article,lS8 has made several proposals that have 
judicial as well as legislative relevance.lSe 
We have observed and documented the fact that the "fore- 
134. Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. at 657-59, 275 N.W.2d at 517-18. 
135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 5 351 and Comment f (1981). 
136. WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (Unabridged) (1971) (emphasis 
added). 
137. See Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. at 657-59,275 N.W.2d a t  517- 
18. 
138. Stone, Allocation of Risk for Product Recall Expenditures: A Legislative Pro- 
posal, 1975 DET. C.L. REV. 1. 
139. Id. at  20-32. For example, one proposal is based upon the following ratio: 
Share of appropriate recall expendi- A figure reflecting supplier's appro- 
tures to be borne by supplier. priate contribution to or responsibil- 
ity for the end product. 
Appropriate recall expenditures paid A figure reflecting (a) manufacturer's 
by manufcturer. appropriate contribution to or re- 
sponsibility for the end product, or 
(b) an appropriate end product 
figure. 
Id. at 26. 
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seeability" test of Hadley v. Baxendale is only one of many fac- 
tors to be taken into consideration when determining the 
recoverability of consequential damages for product recall ex- 
penditures. Of course these factors are not specifically expressed 
in the Hadley rule. They are, however, the principal factors that 
a court will consider relevant in reaching a conclusion. They 
include the following: 
1. Is the seller compensated for the risk? 
2. Does a gross disparity exist between the compensation re- 
ceived by the seller and the damages sought by the buyer? 
3. Was the seller's breach willful? 
4. By interpretation and construction of the agreement, how 
have the parties contracted to allocate risk? 
a. Did the seller and the buyer agree to extend liabil- 
ity to include the damages in question, or to limit or 
preclude such liability? 
b. Are the seller and the buyer in a relatively equal 
bargaining position, or does a significant disparity exist 
between them? 
c. Is the agreement between the seller and the buyer 
so one-sided that the court will not enforce their 
agreement? 
d. Were the terms of the agreement reached by mean- 
ingful bargaining or were they essentially "boiler- 
plate"? 
e. Which party chose the language of the agreement? 
5. Which party can most economically bear the risk? 
The three recent product recall casesl4O demonstrate that 
these factors will influence the resulta of product recall litiga- 
tion. In fact, these cases seem to demonstrate that "foreseeabil- 
ity" states the conclusion rather than the description of the test 
to be applied. 
The more important recent development is the promulga- 
tion of Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 351, subsec- 
tion (3) of which states: 
A court may limit damages for foreseeable loss by exclud- 
ing recovery for loss of profits, by allowing recovery only for 
loss incurred in reliance, or otherwise if it concludes that in the 
140. See United States v. Aerodex, Inc., 469 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1972); United States 
v. Franklin Steel Products, Inc., 482 F.2d 400 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 
(1973); Taylor & Gaskin, Inc. v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., No. 75-71030 (ED. Mich., 
filed Jan. 31, 1980). 
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circumstances justice so requires in order to avoid dispropor- 
tionate compensation. 
Applying this subsection to the earlier Heat Treater hypotheti- 
cal,"' suppose that Heat Treater for a price of $125 heat treats 
50,000 bolts that are affixed to the steering mechanisms of 
50,000 automobiles. At least some of the bolts are later discov- 
ered to be defective-even though Heat Treater has exercised 
due care-and the 50,000 automobiles must be recalled, which 
gives rise to expenditures of $820,000. Assume Heat Treater 
foresees that the defects in the bolts will trigger a recall and yet 
it cannot assess the risk, cannot procure recall insurance, cannot 
add the risk to the cost of its product, cannot set aside a fund 
which will be recognized for tax purposes to pay for the recall 
expenditure, and cannot spread the risk among its various buy- 
ers. Assume further that the recall expenditures are extremely 
disproportionate to the price charged ($125 price charged, 
$820,000 recall expenditure) and that informality of dealing (in- 
cluding the absence of a detailed written contract) indicates that 
there was no careful attempt to allocate all the risks. A court can 
now apply the rule of Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 
351(3) and state explicitly that although Heat Treater foresaw 
that a recall could result from the breach, Heat Treater will not 
be held liable for the recall expenditures since under the circum- 
stances justice so requires. The Court would not have to manip- 
ulate the word "foresee" to reach the just result. 
Of course the Heat Treater hypothetical is subject to innu- 
merable variations. For example: (1) the disparity between the 
compensation received by Heat Treater and the consequential 
damages sought by Auto Company may not be grossly dispro- 
portionate; (2) Heat Treater's breach may be due to its negli- 
gence or willfulness; (3) faulty installation of the bolts by Auto 
Company may weaken the causal link between the breach and 
the recall; (4) Auto Company may have breached its duty to mit- 
igate losses, etc. Upon whom should the loss fall in these situa- 
tions in order to reach the just result? Comment f to Restate- 
ment (Second) of Contracts section 35114" suggests that a 
solution may be to allocate the risks fairly. The choice need not 
be all or nothing. 
141. See Part I1 supra. 
142. See note 121 supra. See also R i m  & Arnold, Causal Apportionment in the 
Law of Torts: An Economic Theory, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1399 (1980). 
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The adaptation and modification of the Hadley rule by 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 351 is illustrative of 
Llewellyn's Grand Style of the Common Law. This style fosters 
the "on-going production and improvement of rules which make 
sense on their face."141 Legal precedent will evolve in more 
orderly and predictable fashion if courts in future product recall 
decisions will not hesitate to state the factors that influenced 
them and elaborate upon the reasoning underlying the applica- 
tion of those factors. 
143. See K. LLEWEUYN, supra note 51, at 38. See also id. at 186 (the drafti i  phi- 
losophy of the U.C.C. has been "open-ended draftii, with room for courts to move in 
and readjust over the decades"); R. Danzig, Hadley u. Baxendale: A Study in the Indus- 
trialization of the Law, 4 J .  LEGAL STUD. 249 (1975) (rule of Hadley needs to be reviewed 
and revised in order to function in the modern world). 
